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Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age:
Federalism and the Railroad Problem
Herbert Hovenkamp-
The regulation of railroads during the Gilded Age has been the focal point of
many theories of economic regulation. Two of the three theories that are promi-
nent today-the "public interest theory" and the New Left "capture the-
ory"-have their genesis in that debate. In this Article, Professor Hovenkamp
criticizes recent revisionist histories, which argue that early federal railroad
regulation represents a clear case of inefficient capture by the regulated in-
dustry. Hovenkamp argues that the New Left history of the Gilded Age ignores
the models of classical federalism and classical economics that dominated
policymaking in the late 19th century. A proper understanding of the eco-
nomic and political models of the time, he argues, supports the conclusion that
although the railroads did support federal regulation, that regulation was
consistent with the public interest model of regulation.
Few issues have been as controversial or have aroused every level and
branch of government as much as the proper relation between the sover-
eign and the railroads during the late 19th century. The reasons for the
controversy are clear. Both the economics and the politics of business reg-
ulation were going through a period of convulsive change, particularly in
those businesses identified by the Supreme Court as "affected with a pub-
lic interest."' In economics, although the modern theory of natural mo-
nopoly utility regulation had not emerged, economists were becoming
aware that certain industries were subject to substantial market failures
that hindered efficient competition.2 Railroads were the most important of
these industries.' In politics, a variety of interests stood to gain from a
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Louis B. Schwartz, Frank H.
Easterbrook, Lester G. Telser, and Sheldon F. Kurtz for reading an earlier draft.
1. These included common carriers and public utilities such as gas lighting, the telegraph, and,
later, electricity and the telephone. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 130 (1876).
2. Among the first to make this observation was John Stuart Mill, who argued in Principles of
Political Economy that the London gas light industry would perform more efficiently if it were a
regulated monopoly rather than a competitive industry. J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY 143 (W. Ashley rev. ed. 1923) (1848); see also Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial
Action, I PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. A., Jan. 1887, at 55. For the contemporary understanding of
natural monopoly in the railroad industry by one of its most notable regulators, see Adams, The
Railroad System, in CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER ESSAYS 360-66 (1871).
3. Other such industries included gas light utilities and telegraphs, which were of recent origin,
and toll bridges, which were older. See Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics and Regulated Monopoly:
An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1263, 1284-95 (1984).
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particular government policy concerning the railroads. The political con-
troversy was sharp because the stakes were so high: In the 1880's, the
railroads were one of the largest areas of American economic activity, and
by 1900, railroad assets accounted for about ten percent of American
wealth.4
Historical studies of why Gilded Age railroad regulation took the shape
it did generally have focused so heavily on the politics of the period that
they have overlooked the fact that 19th century political economists devel-
oped a sophisticated regulatory theory. This Article searches for the
proper balance between interest group politics and economics in Gilded
Age regulatory policy by attempting to take the regulatory theory of the
day seriously. This theory often provides better explanations than does the
parsing of vested political interests, even though these interests were
substantial.
The problem of railroad regulation in the Gilded Age involved two
broad, very different issues: how should the railroads be regulated, and
which sovereign-state or federal-is the optimal regulator. The first Sec-
tion of this Article provides the background for an examination of these
issues by reviewing the two major theories of economic regulation-the
public interest theory and the capture theory-that historians have em-
ployed to explain railroad regulation in the Gilded Age. It also presents
the understandings of regulatory economics and federalism that were dom-
inant in that era, because an explanation of regulatory legislation must
draw from the economic and political pressures that operated on the legis-
lators of the period.
Section II of the essay analyzes the economics of railroad rates and
demonstrates that railroads represented in the 1880's what later econo-
mists understood to be a natural monopoly. But economics of the 19th
century was dominated by a classical theory that contained a poorly
formed model of natural monopoly. That economic theory-imperfect as
they were-explains most aspects of the regulatory history of railroads
during the late 19th century.
In Section III, the Article explores the most important and controversial
problem of railroad regulatory policy in the Gilded Age-rate discrimina-
tion. In the process, the Article takes up a subject rarely explored in the
history of Gilded Age and Progressive Era railroad regulation: the "feder-
alist" nature of the great railroad rate controversies. Most studies of rail-
road regulation in this period focus exclusively either on federal regula-
tion' or on state regulation.' Both approaches yield exaggerations or
4. H. FAULKNER, PoLrrics, REFORM AND EXPANSION: 1890-1900, at 75 (1959). See generally
A. CHANDLER, THE RAILROADS-THE NATION'S FIRST BIG BUSINESS (1965).
5. See, e.g., Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986)
(discussing federal regulation in general, including railroads); A. MARTIN, ENTERPRISE DENIED:
ORIGINS OF THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, 1897-1917 (1971); G. KoLRo, RAILROADS
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mischaracterizations that make identification of the public interest, or
proof of regulatory capture, appear too easy.
Part IV shows that to understand state and federal regulatory responses
to rate discrimination, one must look at the great debates over railroad
control as problems of federalism, for the American railroad system was a
network that simultaneously operated in two "markets" and created two
quite different sets of problems. One market was the short-haul, generally
intrastate market; the other was the long-haul, or trunk-line market,
which was generally interstate. Although the federal government re-
sponded to a constituency that was concerned about both sets of problems,
prevailing commerce clause doctrine until the 1910's permitted Congress
to address only the long-haul problem in any comprehensive way.7 Indi-
vidual states, on the other hand, were constitutionally incapable of regu-
lating long-haul traffic directly. After 1886, they had no jurisdiction over
routes or shipments that did not begin and end within the same state.8
Until 1920, the states had final authority over most short-haul traffic.
By looking at railroad regulation as a problem of federalism, one can
see more clearly the relationship between economics and politics in Gilded
Age regulatory policy. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was the first
comprehensive regulatory measure passed by Congress. The states had
been regulating railroads for a half century, and state regulation had con-
tributed significantly to the railroads' financial troubles. The railroads'
worst problem in the Gilded Age was that they were an industry subject
to substantial market failure, but regulation by a sovereign with jurisdic-
tion to control the entire system comprehensively had not yet emerged.
The inevitable process of federal regulation was to take regulatory author-
ity away from the individual states.
The purpose of this Article is not to prove or disprove any particular
AND REGULATION: 1877-1916 (1965).
6. See, e.g., L. BENSON, MERCHANTS, FARMERS, AND RAILROADS: RAILROAD REGULATION
AND NEw YORK POLITICS, 1850-1887 (1955); G. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS
(1971). Although Benson's book discusses federal legislation as well, it does so entirely from the per-
spective of New York lobbyists and political concerns. See also Siegel, Understanding the Lochner
Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187,
210-59 (1984) (looking only at state regulation). Some studies of railroads and government view the
problem from a federalist perspective, but they are concerned with railroad development and subsidy
rather than regulation of rates and practices. C. GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERI-
CAN CANALS AND RAILROADS: 1800-1890 (1960); L. MERCER, RAILROADS AND LAND GRANT POL-
ICY: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION (1982); M. SUMMERS, RAILROADS, RECONSTRUC-
TION, AND THE GOSPEL OF PROSPERITY: AID UNDER THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1865-1877
(1984).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85. Some contemporary railroad scholars argued that,
since Congress had authority only over interstate traffic, a comprehensive regulatory system would
involve federal-state cooperation. See, e.g., Garrett, The Railway Problem, 129 N. AM. REV. 361
(1879) (Congress can regulate to address national concerns but state regulation necessary to address
local problems). A few believed that if a railroad carried any interstate cargo, all of its operations,
including intrastate rates and practices, could be regulated by Congress. Welch, The Inter-State Rail-
way Solvent, 145 N. AM. REV. 86 (1887).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 236-42.
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theory of regulation. Rather, it argues that a failure to appreciate the
complexity of Gilded Age regulatory policy in a federalist system has led
historians to oversimplify the nature of regulation. For example, one of
the most popular historical analyses of the Gilded Age sees the railroad
policy of that era as a clear instance of regulatory capture by the regulated
industry.' A proper understanding of the federalist nature of the railroad
controversy suggests that the eventual federal regulation of railroads, al-
though supported by the railroads themselves, was consistent with the
public interest.
I. UNDERSTANDING REGULATION IN HISTORY
A. Theories of Regulation and the Problem of Federalism
The myopic treatment of economics in the historical writing about rail-
road regulation carries a certain irony, for two of the three major theories
of economic regulation 1 -the public interest theory and the New Left
capture theory-were developed in writing about the railroads. The pub-
lic interest theory-that regulatory policy's purpose is to control the regu-
lated firms' monopoly pricing or other abuses of consumers or labor-was
developed in writings by Charles Francis Adams and Louis Brandeis.
That writing was directed largely at the railroads.1 The heyday of the
public interest theory of regulation-from the Progressive Era until well
after the New Deal-was also the age in which the railroads were the
dominant regulated industry. 2 The Progressive historical critique of fed-
9. See G. KOLKO, supra note 5.
10. The third major theory of regulation-the New Right regulatory capture thesis-has not been
central to the discussion of the history of railroad regulation in the Gilded Age. The New Right view
explains regulation as the result of "rent seeking" by special interest groups, which petition legislative
bodies for regulation to inhibit entry into their markets or to guarantee their profit margins through
price regulation. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249-63, 317-64, 491-507 (3d
ed. 1986); Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45-58 (1984). Importantly, the New Right recognizes that the burden
of market failure often falls on the firms themselves. In such cases, the firms may clamor for regula-
tion through their lobbyists, and the regulation might serve the public interest.
A fourth theory, not addressed here, is not as much a model of regulation as a theory about how
legislation is formulated and passed, and, therefore, how it must be interpreted. See Farber & Frickey,
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873 (1987); Macey, Promoting Public-Re-
garding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986).
11. See T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 1-142 (1984).
12. Scholarship in the public interest genre includes 2 C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1928); E. JOHNSON & T. VAN METRE, PRINCIPLES OF RAILROAD
TRANSPORTATION 499-508 (1926); W. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION 467-73
(1920); 1 1. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCEDURE (1931); Knapp, The Regulation of Railway Rates, 6 PUBLICATIONS AM.
ECON. A. (3d s.) 250 (1905); Meyer, Government Regulation of Railway Rates, 7 PUBLICATIONS
AM. ECON. A. 69 (1906); Ripley, Public Regulation of Railroad Issues, 4 AM. EcON. REv. 541
(1914); Smalley, Railroad Rate Control, 7 PUBLICATIONS AM. EON. A. (3d s.) 327 (1906). Perhaps
the best comprehensive defense of the public interest theory of regulation is J. LANDIS, THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS (1938), which was written in response to the regulatory capture theories that ac-
companied the new realism of the 1930's. Landis substantially repudiated his own position in 1960. J.
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eral railroad regulation"3 was that (1) regulation was necessary to protect
the general public from powerful railroad monopolies too large to be
reached by state legislation, (2) Congress had such regulation in mind
when it passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, and (3) the Act
would have succeeded except for its emasculation at the hands of the Su-
preme Court in a series of decisions that undermined the Commission's
powers. 4
But many of the advocates of the public interest theory, as well as the
liberal historians who adopted it, never understood the economics of rail-
road operation or of Gilded Age regulatory policy. 5 For example, they
tended to regard practices like rate discrimination as "unjust" per se, and
as contrary to the best interest of society. The economic theory suggested
that, although particular groups of shippers might be injured by rate dis-
crimination, the discrimination favored shippers collectively by increasing
the total amount of cargo that the railroads could carry and reducing over-
all shipping costs in the process.'" Without knowing it, the advocates and
historians of the public interest theory often became the spokespersons for
particular interest groups, such as farmers shipping short hauls, and thus
facilitated regulatory capture by particular classes of consumers.
Since the earliest days of federal railroad regulation, writers have noted
the threat of regulatory capture-the possibility that the legislature or
regulatory agency would come to represent the interests of one particular
group of people, rather than those of the public in general. The captors
might be the railroads themselves,' 7 but they might also be farmers or
shippers who would use government control of railroads as a device to
enhance their own welfare at the expense of railroads'" or other groups of
shippers.' In any event, public interest regulation would deteriorate into
politics.
LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) (submitted to U.S.
Senate; calling for reappraisal of activities and functions of regulatory agencies).
13. For the Progressive history, see H. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE: 1897-1917,
at 187-191 (1962); E. KIRKLAND, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE 286-301 (1932).
14. On the last point, see G. KOLKO, supra note 5, at 80-82.
15. E.g., H. FAULKNER, supra note 13.
16. That is, as the volume of shipping increased, the amount of fixed costs that had to be allocated
per unit decreased. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99.
17. See Bolles, Difficulties and Dangers of Government Rate-Making, 181 N. AM. REv. 873,
883-84 (1905).
18. See Gaines, A Living Rate for the Railroads, I YALE REV. (n.s.) 65 (1911) (arguing that
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation of railroad rates stifled necessary growth of railroads);
Gaines, Reasonable Regulation of Railroad Rates, 1 YALE REv. (n.s.) 657 (1912) (arguing that
economics of railroads made them too complicated to be run by any agency; politics rather than sensi-
ble rate-making was sure to result); Hines, Legislative Regulation of Railroad Rates, 4 PUBLICA-
TIONS AM. ECON. A. (3d s.) 84 (1903) (arguing that rate setting by commissioners, who are politi-
cians, will yield political results); McPherson, The Farmer, the Manufacturer and the Railroad, 186
N. AM. REv. 405 (1907) (same); Newcomb, The Diminished Dollar and Railway Rates, 189 N. AM.
REV. 561 (1909) (arguing that shippers had managed to use legislative process to force real rates
down to unremunerative levels).
19. E.g., Meyer, Railway Rates as Protective Tariffs, 14 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1906) (arguing that
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The principal difference between the public interest and capture theo-
ries of regulation is that the public interest theory believes that regulation,
when passed, is efficient; it makes society as a whole better off.2" To be
sure, advocates of the public interest theory historically have not used an
economic word like "efficient" to describe the principal purpose of regula-
tion. They would be more inclined to use words such as "just" or "fair."
Nevertheless, what they had in mind was a regulatory policy in the public
interest, which was identified as the interest of the community as a whole.
Economically, a state of affairs that optimizes the public interest is proba-
bly best described as Pareto-optimal or potentially Pareto-optimal.
In contrast, capture theorists argue that regulation ends up serving
some particular interest group that has managed to make its case to the
legislative body or regulatory agency. Incidentally, the regulation may be
efficient, but often it is not. The first generation of post-Progressive revi-
sionist historians who wrote about the railroads rejected the public interest
theory in favor of a capture theory-but those doing the capturing were
shippers or farmers rather than the railroads themselves. For example,
George Miller 1 argued that the impetus for state railroad regulation in
the Midwest came from merchants dependent on river traffic and con-
cerned about their own interests, whether or not these interests coincided
with the interest of society as a whole. It may also have come from mid-
western farmers seeking to obtain local rates as low as the trunk line rates
to eastern markets. Lee Benson" argued that the impetus for regulation
came from New York City merchants, whose favored position at the gate-
way of America's east-west water routes, primarily the Erie Canal, was
being challenged by the railroads, and from New York farmers injured by
short-haul/long-haul discrimination.2"
The revisionism offered by Miller and Benson is relatively modest in
one respect: both the Progressive public interest theory and the Miller/
Benson theory believed that the underlying purpose of railroad regulation
was to control the railroads for the benefit of shippers. Likewise, both
ICC unduly favored large cities and populated regions at expense of rural areas). But see Lorenz,
Railway Rates as Protective Tariffs-Another View, 14 J. POL. ECON. 170 (1906) (responding to
Meyer).
20. For discussions and critiques of the public interest theory, see Becker, Pressure Groups and
Political Behavior, in CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY: SCHUMPETER REVISITED 120 (1985); Becker,
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371 (1983);
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EON. 211 (1976); Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sm. 335 (1974); Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EON. & MGMT. Sm. 3 (1971). See generally J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DImusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVmW (1980); Farber & Frickey, supra note 10
(arguing that public interest theory of government regulation is far from dead); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985); Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129 (1986).
21. G. MILLER, supra note 6.
22. See L. BENSON, supra note 6.
23. It cost New York farmers about as much to ship their grain to New York City as it cost
midwestern farmers who were four or five times further away.
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believed that the railroads were guilty of abuses and that regulatory legis-
lation was designed to force the railroads to be fair. Self-interest may have
colored their notions about what is "fair," but that is a different matter.
The work of Miller and Benson is subject to two important criticisms.
First, interest group politics standing alone fails to establish regulatory
capture. Iowa farmers, midwestern shippers, New York merchants, and
the railroads each may have wanted regulation for their own benefit, but
that observation is as consistent with the traditional theory of regulation
in the public interest as with any theory of regulatory capture. In fact,
efficient regulation should claim more widespread support than inefficient
regulation, because efficient regulation creates greater net benefits. Any
convincing theory of regulatory capture must show not only that some
interest group wanted a particular regulatory regime and successfully ob-
tained it. It must also show that the interest group succeeded, even though
the regulation resulted in more damage to other interests than benefits to
its supporters. Neither Benson nor Miller tried to do this.
Second, neither Benson nor Miller addressed the economic content of
19th century regulatory policy. By and large, Gilded Age railroad econo-
mists defended widespread rate discrimination, which was the object of
the intensive campaigns described by both Benson and Miller, as economi-
cally efficient. These late 19th century economic notions have been sur-
prisingly robust, and they continue to form an important part of regula-
tory policy, subject only to technical revision.
But the disdain for economics in the public interest theory of regulation
or in the essentially Progressive critiques of Benson and Miller is nothing
like that contained in the New Left regulatory capture hypothesis, cham-
pioned principally by Gabriel Kolko in Railroads and Regulation.2 4 Ac-
cording to that theory, regulatory policy, no matter what its initial motive,
inevitably falls under the control of the regulated firms. Regulation pro-
tects firms from competition, either by controlling rates or restricting en-
try, and it guarantees their profit margins, no matter how inefficient their
investments or operations. Kolko's "proof" of the regulatory capture hy-
pothesis was dramatic. He examined forty years of the legislative and po-
litical history of federal railroad regulation and showed that, far from op-
posing each marginal increase in federal regulatory authority, the
railroads were among the strongest supporters. They supported most of
the provisions of the original Interstate Commerce Act, as well as most
subsequent amendments that broadened federal power and eventually pre-
empted state control.25 In many cases they received almost exactly what
they wanted. Kolko's book presented incontrovertible evidence that a prin-
24. G. KOLKO, supra note 5.
25. See infra notes 261-93 and accompanying text.
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cipal beneficiary of federal policy toward the railroads during this period
was the railroads themselves.
Kolko's study encouraged a broad-based, New Left cynicism about gov-
ernment regulation.26 The gist of the cynical argument is that, good inten-
tions notwithstanding, regulation is almost always passed for the benefit
of the regulated, mainly in order to protect regulated firms from competi-
tion with one another. Consumers are inevitably regulation's victims
rather than its beneficiaries. Ironically, this argument is popular not only
with the New Left, but also with parts of the right,27 who have their own
theory of regulatory capture."' Only a few liberals remain to defend the
traditional public interest theory,29 which today is widely characterized as
naive, out-of-date, inefficient, or-perhaps most painful of
all-anticonsumer.30
But Kolko overstated his case, erring at least as much in one direction
as the Progressive critique had in the other."1 First, he minimized or ig-
nored the role that state regulation played in the overall structure of rail-
road regulation. 2 Second, he made no attempt to explain how the politics
and the economics of the railroad industry engaged each other. In Kolko's
mind, every dispute became pure politics. Railroads and Regulation is a
book about railroad lobbying, not about railroad economics. Perhaps his
anticapitalist biases prevented him from seeing that in a market economy
that includes privately owned regulated firms, the public also has an in-
terest in the long run. The long run in this case included federal protec-
26. Other revisionist work includes L. DAVIS & D. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 157-66 (1971); E. KIRKLAND, DREAM AND THOUGHT IN THE
BUSINESS COMMUNITY, 1860-1900, at 1-28 (1956); P. MACAvoY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
REGULATION: THE TRUNK-LINE RAILROAD CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS-
SION BEFORE 1900 (1965); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920, at 133-63 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 10; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533, 545-48 (1983); Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761, 774 (1987).
28. See supra note 10.
29. In fact, even among liberals acknowledgement of widespread regulatory capture is common.
See, e.g., Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1986);
Hovenkamp & Mackerron, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV.
719 (1985).
30. See e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 15.
31. See Purcell, Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 J. AM.
HIsT. 561, 561-63 (1967). Purcell notes that "business" interests were far less unified than either
Kolko or other revisionist historians, such as Lee Benson, suggested. Different groups of shippers,
including farmers, and even different business people with railroad interests wanted different kinds of
regulatory approaches. See also Harbeson, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916: Conspiracy or
Public Interest?, 27 J. ECON. HIsT. 230 (1967). The most comprehensive counterargument to Kolko
is A. MARTIN, supra note 5. Good summaries of the Progressive theory and those of the revisionists
are contained in S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NA-
TIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 125-50 (1982), and McCraw, Regulation in
America: A Review Article, 49 Bus. HIST. REv. 159 (1975).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 194-60.
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tion from aggressive state regulatory policies that were driving the rail-
roads to ruin.3
In the absence of a coherent model for natural monopoly, even one who
had no anticapitalist bias would be inclined to view the situation as Kolko
saw it. The 19th century debate was excessively politicized, because it was
not guided by an economic model that explained railroad behavior in any
robust way. However, as an economic explanation emerged, regulatory
alternatives appeared that might work to the best interest of both railroads
and consumers. Kolko wrote as if Gilded Age regulatory economics had
nothing to contribute to Gilded Age railroad practice or policy. As a re-
sult, although many of the facts he cited were correct-for example, that
by 1887 the railroads were in deep trouble and wanted federal legislation
to bail them out" 4-he missed the point.
The point, once again, is that not every regulation that is supported by
the regulated interests constitutes regulatory capture. Implicit in Kolko's
argument is an hypothesis about the public interest theory of regulation
that only its most simple-minded adherents would support: anything that
benefits the regulated firm must not be in the public interest. Thus, the
railroads and the shippers were playing a zero-sum game. Any time the
railroads won a point, the consumers or shippers necessarily lost. But if
both political and economic considerations were relevant, then the rail-
roads and the shippers were not playing a zero-sum game at all. Some
regulatory approaches could in fact create solutions that simultaneously
benefited consumers or shippers and saved the railroads from financial
difficulty.
In one important sense the Progressive public interest theory of regula-
tion is more responsive to the historical record than is the Kolko regula-
tory capture thesis. The public interest theory acknowledges, at least in
principle, that regulatory decisionmaking can have an economic content.
Within the Progressive regulatory model, some regulatory solutions were
seen as better for the community as a whole, even though they injured
certain interests. The Progressives may have been mistaken to assume that
there was an optimal theory of regulation that would emerge from the
political process. But if economics has any role in regulatory policy, it is to
develop models for regulatory approaches that are better than the alterna-
tives. The Progressives, unlike the New Left, were willing to assume that
such approaches existed and that right-minded public officials could some-
times find them.
It is important to understand Gilded Age railroad regulation as a prob-
lem of federalism. Writing during the Gilded Age, distinguished legal
scholar and eventual railroad regulator Thomas M. Cooley understood
33. See infra text accompanying notes 261-93.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 138-41.
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the most fundamental problem of railroad rate regulation far better than
many of the historians who have written about it since:
What is a fatal impediment to its control by law is, that the States
and the nation have, in respect to it, a divided power; and while it is
for the interest of the nation at large to encourage the competition
which favors long hauls, it is for the interest of localities to make
competition most active in short hauls. A State is therefore likely to
favor legislation which compels proportional charges, or something
near such charges, for all distances; but this, if it should be adopted
and enforced, would preclude the great through lines of New York
and Pennsylvania from competing at Chicago, St. Paul, and St.
Louis in the grain-carrying trade of the Northwest, and would re-
duce such links as are wholly within a State, to the condition of mere
local roads, compelled to make high charges or go into bankruptcy."5
By looking only at federal regulation, Kolko 6 made the historical case
for regulatory capture look much stronger than it is. In the 1880's, states
had jurisdiction only over intrastate routes, where rates tended to be very
high. On the other hand, the federal government had jurisdiction only
over interstate routes, where competition had driven rates on most routes
so low that they were unremunerative' As a result, the problem Con-
gress faced in the final decades of the 19th century was not high railroad
rates but rather the potential collapse of the national railroad system as a
result of rate wars or overzealous state regulation. In failing to recognize
the importance of federalism, Kolko stacked the deck.
B. Motive or Model: Regulatory Statutes and Legislative Intent
Much has been written about the intent of Congress in passing statutes
designed to control the railroads, such as the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887,8 the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890,11 and their successor stat-
utes.40 Likewise, much has been written about the intent of state legisla-
35. Cooley, State Regulation of Corporate Profits, 137 N. AM. REV. 205, 215 (1883). The solu-
tion for Cooley was that rates should not be regulated at all; competition would be much fairer to
shippers and suppliers alike. In those few cases-mostly involving municipal utility monopo-
lies-where no competition existed, rate regulation might be necessary. Then it should be carried on
with rigorous attention to the public interest. Id. at 216.
36. G. KOLKO, supra note 5.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 81-89.
38. See, e.g., G. KoLo, supra note 5, at 35-71; A. MARTIN, supra note 5; Martin, The Troub-
led Subject of Railroad Regulation in the Gilded Age-A Reappraisal, 61 J. AM. HiST. 339 (1974);
Rabin, supra note 5, at 1209-13.
39. See W. LErWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRuST ACT (1965); H. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTrrRuST POuCY (1954); Bork, Leg-
islative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966); Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 249-52 (1985); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Origi-
nal and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGs L.J.
65, 80-106 (1982).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 263-66.
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tures in passing various regulatory statutes such as the Granger laws41 or
the New York scheme of railroad regulation. In almost every case, the
word "intent" means subjective intent, and the author examines state-
ments made by participants in the legislative process. 42
Those who ascribe a "motive" to Congress when looking at thirty or so
years of regulatory legislation are applying an individual psychological
metaphor to a large legislative body, and the metaphor does not work
well.4 The members of Congress considering railroad legislation had
widely different constituencies-those that benefited from low rates for
long hauls, such as midwestern shippers, 44 and those that were injured by
them, such as New York shippers;45 those that benefited from price dis-
crimination and those that were injured by it; farmers; easterners; wes-
terners; and railroaders themselves. The political process that yielded the
antipooling and antidiscrimination provisions of the original 1887 Inter-
state Commerce Act cannot be reduced to something as simple and unified
as a particular congressional intent. As in most controversial statutes, each
clause of the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act had a unique set of support-
ers and critics, as did each subsequent statutory amendment. It is difficult
to fashion from this hodgepodge anything resembling unitary subjective
"intent."
The problem of intent in the state legislatures is generally simpler, even
though the legislative histories are much thinner. In this case, less is better
than more, for the enormous legislative history and background of the
Interstate Commerce Act only fosters confusion. More importantly, states
tended to have less complex interests than did the federal government.
This was particularly true of rural midwestern states that had undiversi-
fled economies. For example, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin-three of
the four Granger states46 -had overwhelmingly agricultural economies
and relatively few railroad interests. It is fairly clear that the purpose of
the Granger laws was to improve the economic welfare of resident
farmers.47
41. E.g., G. MILLER, supra note 6. The Granges were organizations of farmers formed during
the late 1860's. Their purpose was to improve the economic welfare of farmers, principally by lobby-
ing state legislatures to set maximum railroad rates. Id.
42. Of course, there are the usual questions about whether statements made by those opposing
legislation should be counted as describing congressional "intent," or at least whether they are entitled
to be counted as much as statements by drafters or other supporters. Those opposing legislation are
likely to exaggerate a proposed statute's weaknesses, while they underemphasize or perhaps even
mischaracterize its strengths. People speaking in support of a statute may do the opposite.
43. For particularly pessimistic views, see Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 27, at
547-48; Schofield, Formal Political Theoty, 14 QUALITY & QUANTITY 249, 249-50 (1980). See
generally W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST PoPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).
44. See G. MILLER, supra note 6, at 3-23.
45. See L. BENSON, supra note 6, at 29-54.
46. The fourth Granger state was Illinois, which, because of the presence of Chicago as a major
shipping point, had a somewhat more complex constituency. See G. MILLER, supra note 6, at 59-96.
47. Even here, however, there is evidence that businessmen whose fortunes were tied to river
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"Objective" rather than "subjective" studies of legislative history often
provide more reliable indicators about legislative policy or motive. To un-
derstand why a legislative body acted, it is often more important to know
something about the economic, psychological, and intellectual pressures on
the legislature than what its individual members said. They are playing to
the gallery far too often. As a result, the historian trying to understand
regulatory legislation should pay more attention to the prevailing eco-
nomic views and political pressures of the day, and less to the manifold,
inconsistent statements of subjective Congressional intent. Intellectual his-
tory and economic history can be more valuable than legislative history as
explanatory devices.
C. The Politics and Economics of Gilded Age Railroad Policy
The relative weight of distributive and efficiency concerns in legislative
policy depends on the state of science in the area affected by the policy."8
Distributive concerns are always present and generally well known to
gainers and losers, even if the scientific formulation of a problem is rela-
tively primitive or naive. Without a robust model that describes a social
problem and makes reliable predictions, legislative regulation of that par-
ticular problem will be highly susceptible to politics, for every legislative
proposal produces gainers and losers, whether the resulting regulation is
efficient or even coherent.
As a robust model develops and becomes an acceptable part of normal
science, 49 however, a consensus develops and legislative policy becomes
more coherent. The less controversial the model, the more isolated and
impotent its opponents. When a particular scientific explanation becomes
widely accepted, the state will more likely be able to implement the model
despite the objections of losers. For example, the holders of corporate
charters claiming monopoly power suffered when the prevailing economic
model changed from mercantile to classical political economy. The law
of race discrimination was transformed when the prevailing social science
model changed from genetic determinism to environmentalism."1 On the
other hand, those areas where science appears not to provide satisfactory
answers remain the most politically controversial. 2
transportation also wanted to regulate rate discrimination. See id. at 67.
48. See Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379
(1988); Hovenkamp, supra note 3; Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985
DUKE L.J. 624.
49. On "normal" science, see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 10-34
(2d ed. 1970).
50. See M. Hoswrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 109-139
(1977); Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 1290-93; Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American
Legal Thought, - GEO. L.J. - (1988).
51. See Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, supra note 48, at 665-70.
52. For example, psychology and psychiatry have never forged a robust consensus about the rela-
tionship between mental state and criminal responsibility. As a result, legislative attempts to make
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None of this is to say that the legislative process is always efficient, or
that it is usually inefficient. 3 Economic models define efficient solutions,
but two different models may develop quite different ideas of efficiency."
For example, the "Codes of Fair Competition" developed during the New
Deal, which permitted various kinds of industry cartelization, may have
appeared quite efficient according to the prevailing economic model-the
theory of monopolistic competition. But when neoclassicism reemerged as
the dominant model, the Codes looked like just another way that the regu-
latory process might help businesses avoid competition. The best one can
say is that in the absence of a coherent model, legislation is less likely to
be efficient by any measure. When legislation is guided by a coherent and
robust model, it is more likely to be efficient in terms of that particular
model. It may not be efficient as defined by some other model.
Likewise, no argument is made here that the legislative process, or even
the process of molding scientific models, can transcend politics. On the
contrary, science is as political as any discipline, and a scientific model is
nothing more than a kind of argument that the world should be viewed in
a certain way. Some modernists would have us believe that scientific mod-
els are politically neutral statements whose only purpose is to facilitate
predictions. 55 But in fact models are designed to build consensus. We ac-
cept them because they achieve the results we want or expect. We accept
them because we find them attractive, whether because of their elegance,56
their rhetoric,5 7 or their simplicity, which may be a combination of both.
Nowhere is this view of scientific models clearer than in the formation
of American regulatory policy during the 19th century. When the first
American railroads were built in the 1820's, the dominant American the-
ory of political economy was classicism, although many American jurists
were still educated in a pre-classicist, mercantilist theory. Both mercantil-
ism and classicism had poorly developed theories of natural monopoly.
criminal responsibility a "scientific" issue rather than a moral or legal problem have been highly
controversial and commensurately less successful. See Hovenkamp, Insanity and Criminal Responsi-
bility in Progressive America, 57 N.D.L. REv. 541 (1981).
53. There is a great deal of literature on the question whether legislation is efficient. See Easter-
brook, supra note 10, at 15-17; Farber & Frickey, supra note 10; Macey, supra note 10; Peltzman,
supra note 20; Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982); Stigler, supra note 20.
54. See, e.g., E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933). See also
E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIv-
ALENCE 36-43 (1966).
Likewise, the classical model of welfare economics believed that wealth transfers were neutral at
best, and potentially inefficient. The late neoclassical, or material welfare, school believed that wealth
transfers from the wealthy to the poor increased total welfare, because a dollar held by a poor person
produced more satisfaction than one held by a rich person. Hovenkamp, Political Economy of Sub-
stantive Due Process, supra note 48, 437-38.
55. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POsIvE
ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
56. See Nobel Prize physicist Steven Weinberg's Beautiful Theories (Second Annual Gordon
Mills Lecture on Science and the Humanities, Univ. of Texas, April 5, 1983).
57. See generally D. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985).
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Mercantilists such as Sir William Blackstone5" or Justice Story,59 believed
that the granting of monopoly rights was an important mechanism for
encouraging investment.60 Within the mercantile model, monopoly rights
were generally justified if the investment required to enter a particular
market was relatively large.
At the other extreme, classical political economy was an essentially po-
litical reaction to the guilds, the Corn Laws, and other state-created mo-
nopoly interests produced by the Crown during the Elizabethan period.61
Classical political economy was antimonopolistic with a vengeance, and it
developed elaborate theories showing that monopolies were socially harm-
ful. 2 Most classical political economists-who clearly dominated both ec-
onomic and judicial thinking in America by the 1850's-believed that in
every market, competition among incumbent sellers was the optimal way
to deliver goods and services. For the relatively few exceptions, such as the
provision of streets, lighthouses, or poor relief, there should be no "mar-
ket" at all, and the government should be the only supplier.6 3
Jurists laboring at different periods of the 19th century and considering
large issues of state economic policy accepted either mercantilism or classi-
cism as a basic explanatory model. The shift from one model to the other
explains the rather awesome difference in constitutional "attitude"
presented in Charles River Bridge6 in 1837 and the Slaughter-House
Cases65 less than forty years later. Charles River Bridge made a constitu-
tional issue of whether a monopoly provision should be implied in a char-
ter that did not explicitly contain one. The Slaughter-House Cases made
a constitutional issue of whether a monopoly provision explicitly contained
in a charter was invalid because market participants had a constitutional
right to a competitive regime. In less than four decades, a mere economic
revolution had stood the Constitution on its head.
Classical political economy generally began with the premise that all
markets worked best if they were competitive. Furthermore, Adam
Smith's "pure" classical political economy, without the market failures
later perceived by Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and John Stuart
58. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 50, at 115.
59. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 608 (1837) (Story, J.,
dissenting); see also M. HORWITZ, supra note 50, at 118; Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 1287-92.
60. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 1291-92.
61. See The Case of Monopolies, 11 Coke 84, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602). See generally De
Roover, Monopoly Theory Prior to Adam Smith: A Revision, 65 Q.J. ECoN. 492 (1951); Letwin, The
English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. Ciii. L. REv. 355 (1954).
62. For a contemporary American argument, see Nott, Monopolies, I INT'L REV. 370 (1874).
63. For a candid perspective on the difficulties faced by an economist trained in the classical
tradition and then learning about large industries in which competition will not work, see Hadley,
Legal Theories of Price Regulation, 1 YALE REV. 56 (o.s.) (1891). But see Lewis, Can Prices be
Regulated by Law? 6 AM. L. REG. (2d s.) 9 (1893) (responding to Hadley).
64. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 608 (1837) (Story, J.,
dissenting).
65. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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Mill, lasted much longer in the United States than it did in England. 6
Even as late as the 1880's, when substantial evidence indicated that rail-
roads performed poorly under competition, some die-hard classicists con-
tinued to assert the classical model. In 1884, Gerrit Lansing argued that
rate regulation of railroads was completely unnecessary, because competi-
tion was quite adequate to control the problem.17
Lansing believed that in the long run the railroads could not earn a
higher return on their capital than other industries earned, because capital
always flows to where the return is highest. As a result, new investment
in railroads would continue until competition drove returns down to the
level prevailing in other industries.6 8 This attitude undoubtedly contrib-
uted much to the railroad overdevelopment already ruining the industry in
the 1880's."' Lansing failed to perceive the difficulty of his distinctly class-
ical argument in a market where the classical model fell apart.70 If rail-
roads were indeed a natural monopoly, monopoly railroads would earn
monopoly returns, while competitive railroads would earn negative re-
turns. There was no unregulated equilibrium at which they would per-
form competitively. 1
D. Federalism, Classicism, and the Interstate Market for Railroad
Transportation
1. The Railroads and the Growth of Interstate Markets
Although the development of railroads in the United States left behind
its share of individual victims,72  virtually every major interest
group-farmers, other shippers, investors, and certainly consum-
ers-profited immensely in the aggregate. Railroads made more goods
available to more people at a lower price. They made economic develop-
ment of the Midwest possible and greatly hastened the pace of develop-
ment in the eastern seaboard, the South, and the West."
To be sure, railroads often earned monopoly returns-particularly in
66. See Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, supra note 48, at
411-37.
67. Lansing, The Railway and the State, 138 N. AM. REV. 461, 475 (1884).
68. Id. at 462-63.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 138-41.
70. Indeed, by the time Lansing wrote, many European countries had begun to socialize their
railroad systems. See A. HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS
236-37 (1885).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 93-99.
72. An example is the settlers in the San Joaquin Valley, California, who suffered as a result of
railroad development. See F. NORRis, THE Ocropus (1931).
73. There is some controversial evidence to the contrary. See R. FOGEL, RAILROADS AND AMERI-
CAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN ECONOMETRIC HISTORY (1964). Fogel's thesis that the rail-
roads made only a modest contribution to American economic growth is criticized in McClelland,
Railroads, American Growth, and the New Economic History: A Critique, 28 J. ECON. HIST. 102
(1968); see also D. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 57, at 114-19 (summarizing Fogel's thesis and charac-
terizing his argument as overly rhetorical and self-referential).
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the early period of their development-but they earned them because rail-
roads were so much better than the alternatives. Even the most monopolis-
tic railroad freight rates were lower than the prevailing rates under older
forms of transportation. As Yale political economist Arthur Twining
Hadley noted in 1885, before the coming of the railroads, wheat could be
economically shipped only about 200 miles from the place where it was
grown. Railroads eventually made nationwide and worldwide shipping of
wheat and other foodstuffs commonplace. 4 This market expansion was a
mixed blessing for farmers and other shippers. On the one hand, they
could market their products over a much wider area. On the other hand,
everyone else could do the same, and the market for many products be-
came much more competitive. Ironically, although many of the railroads
were monopolies, they destroyed many more local monopolies than they
created by facilitating competition between regions. In fact, one of the
greatest complaints of eastern shippers, particularly of New York
merchants, was that the railroads undermined their favored position at the
gateway of American commerce by giving other cities the same access to
worldwide markets. 5
The railroads did not only create interstate markets for many of the
products that they shipped; they themselves became a large interstate mar-
ket-namely the market for interstate transportation services. Both com-
petition and essential cooperation among railroads took place on a na-
tional rather than an intrastate scale. This emergence of a national
transportation market explains why the problem of railroad regulation so
quickly became a problem of federalism as well."
2. The Classical Theory of Federalism
During the Taney period,77 the Supreme Court adopted a constitutional
theory of federalism drawn largely from classical political economy.78 In
fact, the Jacksonian federalism that eventually dominated the 19th century
law of federal-state relations represented the triumph of classical economic
theory in American public law. The great legal writers like Cooley, who
contributed so much to the development of laissez-faire constitutional the-
ory, were Jacksonians trained in a western, expansionist, antistatist tradi-
74. A. HADLEY, supra note 70, at 65-66. Charles Francis Adams, Jr. quoted slightly different
figures fourteen years earlier. He believed that before the emergence of railroads, it cost as much to
ship a bushel of corn 125 miles as the corn was worth, or as much to ship a bushel of wheat 250 miles
as the wheat was worth. Adams, supra note 2, at 356.
75. See G. KOLKO, supra note 9, at 18-25. See generally L. BE.NsoN, supra note 22, at 80-87.
76. On the railroad system in 1890 and its development, see G. TAYLOR & I. NEU, THE AMERi-
CAN RAILROAD NETWORK, 1861-1890 (1956). States had to contend with other natural monopolies,
including toll bridges, gas lights, and waterworks, but these other monopolies largely operated in
discrete, intrastate markets.
77. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney was appointed by President Jackson in 1836 and served until
1864.
78. See Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, supra note 50.
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tion, that believed state regulation was often little more than a grant of
special privilege to the politically favored. 79 Within this Jacksonian the-
ory, competition was the preferred regulator of commercial markets. Gov-
ernmental control, particularly federal control, was the exception rather
than the rule, and the common law was not yet thought of as a "regula-
tory" device.
This classical concept of federalism, with its built-in bias against gov-
ernmental intervention, created so many regulatory vacuums that it hin-
dered comprehensive regulation of interstate markets.80 The developers of
classical federalism assumed that substantial government regulation would
not be necessary. As a result, they ignored the fact that even in the early
19th century there were many interstate markets and that most of those
markets did not follow state lines. Failures in such markets were inher-
ently interstate problems.
Under the classical theory of federalism, the states could control only
intrastate transactions. Decisions like Gibbons v. Ogden,," Pennoyer v.
Neff,82 and Swift v. Tyson"' greatly limited a state's power to regulate
outside its boundaries. Likewise, the federal government had exclusive
control over interstate movement, but not generally over transactions
within a single state that merely affected interstate commerce.8 4 For this
reason, members of Congress, such as the authors of the Cullom Commit-
tee Report, which preceded the passage of the Interstate commerce act,
refused to assert any authority over intrastate railroad traffic.8 5
Classical federalism's regulatory model often gave neither the states nor
the federal government effective control over spillovers-areas in which
intrastate transactions had interstate effects, or interstate movement had
local effects. The high point of this regulatory attitude was the E.G.
79. See Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism". A Reconsideration, 53
J. Am. HIsT. 751 (1967); see also M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BE-
LIEF 142-56 (1957); Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Ori-
gins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HisT. REV. 293 (1985); Gold, Redfield, Rail-
roads, and the Roots of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism," 27 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 254 (1983). On
the Jacksonian roots of laissez-faire constitutional theory, see W. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 148-55 (1982).
80. Ironically, the much broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause and of state extraterrito-
rial power that emerged in the 20th century have turned the federal system into one that chronically
overregulates, because so many markets are subject to simultaneous federal and state control.
81. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (commerce clause prevents state from creating monopoly steam-
ship line between itself and another state).
82. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (concluding that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and au-
thority over persons or property without its territory" and that "the laws of one State have no opera-
tion outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity .... ").
83. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (applying general common law rather than state law in diversity
cases in federal courts). See Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised (Book Review), 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201
(1982).
84. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514, 520 (1906); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211, 247 (1899). See R. REEDER, THE VALIDITY OF RATE REGULATIONS,
STATE AND FEDERAL 15-16 (1914).
85. See S. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-39 (1886).
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Knight8 ' decision in 1895, which interpreted the Commerce Clause nar-
rowly to deny Congress the power to regulate interstate manufacturing
trusts. The courts had already established that states did not have jurisdic-
tional power to control such trusts.87 The result of E.C. Knight was a
regulatory vacuum88 so large that the Supreme Court soon changed its
mind and expanded federal power over interstate commerce.8 9
The classical theory of federalism led America to undertake a funda-
mentally irrational plan that, on the whole, proved to be extraordinarily
successful: to develop an interstate railroad system largely by means of
state initiative' and almost exclusively under state control. It took nearly
a century for federal policymakers to decide that national markets require
federal regulation and suppression of inconsistent regulation from the
states.9 '
86. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
87. E.g., State v. Standard Oil, 49 Ohio 137, 30 N.E. 279 (1892). Standard Oil was found to be
in violation of the state common law of trade restraints and ordered to divest its out-of-state assets. It
responded to the Ohio decree by forming a new corporation under New Jersey law and transferring
all the affected assets there. See B. BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY: THE STAN-
DARD OIL CASES, 1890-1911, at 10-39 (1979); see also People v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 7 RAIL-
WAY & CORP. L.J. 83 (Cal. 1890); People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N.Y. 582, 24 N.E.
834 (1890); State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N.W. 155 (1890); People ex rel.
Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Il1. 268, 22 N.E. 798 (1889); Louisiana v. American Cotton
Oil Trust, 1 RAILWAY & CORP. L.J. 509 (La. 1887). In each of these cases, the corporations re-
sponded to the state dissolution decree by reincorporating under the liberalized New Jersey law.
McCurdy, The Knight Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law,
1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. REv. 304, 323 (1979).
88. See E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 20-21 (1934); see also Stewart,
Progress of the Law, 43 AM. L. REG. & REV. 77, 88-90 (1895) (scathing review of E.C. Knight
decision, which concludes that Knight left both states and Congress "powerless to overthrow" inter-
state trusts).
Charles McCurdy disputes the notion that the Knight decision effectively created a regulatory vac-
uum with respect to interstate manufacturing companies. See McCurdy, supra note 87. McCurdy
argues that although the states had no power to reach productive assets or corporations in other states,
they did have the power to prevent productive assets within their own states from being acquired by
foreign corporations. But McCurdy cites for that proposition cases holding that states could prevent
their own corporations from acquiring shares in a New Jersey holding company. Id. at 330-34 &
n.102 (citing, e.g., McCutcheon v. Merz Capsule Co., 71 F. 787 (6th Cir. 1896)).
Some trusts were formed when subsidiary corporations desired to exchange their shares for shares
in the holding company, but the part of that transaction in which the holding company shares passed
to the subsidiary was illegal under the laws of most states. State law often did not reach asset acquisi-
tions. See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887) (finding merger to
monopoly by asset acquisition legal). Likewise, state law generally could not reach cash purchases of
shares by holding companies chartered in other states. As McCurdy himself notes, states did not
mount a successful attack on trusts organized under liberalized corporation laws such as those of New
Jersey. McCurdy, supra note 87, at 338.
89. E.g., Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 48 (1904); United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 296-99 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
90. Although federal subsidies, particularly via land grants, were a significant supplement to state
and local subsidies, see generally C. GOODRICH, supra note 6, at 169-203, before 1887 federal regula-
tion was virtually nonexistent, except for regulations written into the particular charters of federally
chartered railroads. See Rabin, supra note 5, at 1196.
91. The relevant dates are 1826, when the first American railroad was chartered by Massachu-
setts, to 1920, when the Federal Transportation Act was passed to give the federal government au-
thority over even intrastate rate-making. See C. ADAMS, RAILROADS: THEIR ORIGIN AND PROBLEMS
47 (1893); see also infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
1034
Regulatory Conflict
II. THE RAILWAY PROBLEM
From about the end of the Civil War until well after the passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, a number of interrelated theoretical
concerns about the governance of railroads led to what many called "the
railway problem." 92 The fundamental problem at the root of all these
difficulties was that the laws of competition developed in classical eco-
nomic theory were not working well for the railroads. Monopoly railroads
earned monopoly profits, while competing railroads were driven into
bankruptcy. This economic problem quickly became a constitutional prob-
lem, for it meant that some sort of sovereign intervention might be re-
quired-precisely the kind of intervention that the classical theory of fed-
eralism made so difficult.
A. The Simple Economics of Railroad Rates
Both the difficult economic problem of railroad regulation and the
closely related problem of federalism result from the same fact: narrowly
considered, a railroad line between two given points is a "natural monop-
oly."" 3 Both the building of tracks and the operation of trains are subject
to substantial economies of scale. As a result, in most cases the total fixed
and variable costs of operating one railroad between two given points are
significantly lower than the total costs of operating two railroads between
the same two points, which, in turn, are lower than the total costs of
operating three railroads. A single line is generally capable of handling all
the traffic, and the acquisition of land, and construction and maintenance
of the track incur some of the largest costs of operating a railroad. Fur-
thermore, even on a single line, the cost of shipping tends to decline as
volume increases. For example, larger trains carry cargo at a lower cost
per unit than do smaller trains. As additional cars are added, the cost per
car decreases. The optimal system would have a single railroad operating
between two given points and earning only a competitive return. How-
ever, since a privately owned railroad seeks to maximixe its profits just as
much as any other private firm, monopoly railroads can be expected to
charge monopoly prices.
Nothing is deadlier for a natural monopoly firm than to be thrown into
"unnatural" competition. Within the neoclassical economic model, there is
92. E.g., A. FINK, THE RAILROAD PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION (1880); A. STICKNEY, THE
RAILWAY PROBLEM (1891); Bryce, The Railway Problem: L The Legislative Solution, 164 N. AM.
REv. 327 (1897); Garrett, The Railway Problem, 129 N. AM. REv. 361 (1879); Patterson, The Rail-
way Problem, 13 PRINcETON REV. (4th s.) 36 (1884); Waite, The Railway Problem: II. A Mercantile
View, 164 N. AM. REv. 338 (1897). See also James, The Railway Question, 2 PUBLICATIONS AM.
ECON. A. 236 (1887); Morris, The Railway Crisis: A Way Out, 4 YALE REV. (n.s.) 520 (1915).
93. Initially, the discussion addresses only a single line or parallel lines between the same two
points. As the later discussion indicates, competition between railroad lines that were not parallel
could be substantial.
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no equilibrium94 at which two or more natural monopoly competitors can
both behave competitively and earn positive rates of return. Total costs of
operating railroads rise as the number of railroads operating between two
given points increases, because the large capital costs of building lines
must be incurred multiple times, even though one line is capable of carry-
ing all the traffic. However, prices are likely to go down as the railroads
compete with each other for business. Although railroads have very high
fixed costs (acquisition of land, assuming they have to pay for it,95 con-
struction of tracks, and acquisition of trains), they have relatively low va-
riable costs (fuel and wages). As a result, a price equal to short-run mar-
ginal cost-the cost of accepting an additional package for shipment on a
train that is already scheduled-is much less than the total cost that ship-
ping the package imposes on the railroad. Under competition, prices will
be driven down to a level sufficient to cover operating costs, but insuffi-
cient to cover the fixed costs, and the railroad will be unable to service its
long-term debts.
To take a simple example, assume that a railroad must pay $100,000
monthly in order to amortize its fixed costs on a certain route. Once the
land is acquired and the tracks built, this amount must be paid whether
or not the trains run, and it does not vary with the amount of freight the
trains carry. The railroad makes 100 runs per month on this route, with
trains capable of carrying 1000 units of cargo each. Thus, in order to
cover its fixed costs alone, the railroad must receive $1.00 per unit. But
the cost of accepting an additional unit of cargo on such a train is small,
perhaps 40 cents per unit.96 Assuming that the variable costs of shipping
(i.e., the costs of fuel and labor) are constant,9" the railroad would make a
reasonable profit at a rate of $1.40-enough to pay both its fixed and
variable costs, which are defined to include a sufficient profit to maintain
investment in the industry.
The unregulated monopoly railroad cannot be expected to charge $1.40.
Rather it will charge the amount it estimates the traffic will bear, and this
price may very well be much higher than $1.40. For example, if the clos-
est competitors are horse-driven wagons, which must charge $2.50 per
94. That is, there is no stable situation.
95. In fact, frequently they did not have to pay for land, and this accounts for a great deal of the
overdevelopment. See generally L. MERCER, supra note 6. See also C. GOODRICH, supra note 6.
96. This ratio of fixed to variable costs is consistent with the ratios found to obtain in 1873 on the
Louisville & Nashville and Great Southern Railroad. A. FINK, COST OF RAILROAD TRANSPORTA-
TION, RAILROAD ACCOUNTS, AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF RAILROADS (1875); Fink, Cost
of Railroad Transportation, 1 J. RAILWAY A. AM. 46, 53 (1874). Fink estimated that the ratio of
fixed costs to direct operating costs on the different lines of that railroad varied from approximately
.38 to approximately 2.44.
97. In fact, these costs are not constant, but decline as the train becomes larger. For example, both
a train with 10 cars and a train with 60 cars might need a crew of four. Likewise, it costs about as
much to ship a half empty car as it costs to ship one that is completely filled. These facts make the
railroad's natural monopoly situation even more extreme.
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unit in order to make a profit, the railroad might maximize its profits at a
price of $2.40.
A state policymaker witnessing these high railroad profits might be dis-
turbed. If this policymaker were a classicist, the first solution that would
come to mind would not be rate regulation, but competition. Under a
competitive regime, if a second railroad line were chartered and built be-
tween the same two points, fixed costs would double. There would be two
lines, each of which must pay $100,000 monthly in order to recoup its
investment in its land, tracks, and equipment. If the volume of shipping
were to remain constant at 1000 units between the two points, the fixed
cost component of the freight rate would have to be doubled to $2.00 per
unit, for each railroad would carry only one half the traffic.98 This market
is a natural monopoly, because fixed costs are lowest when a single firm
satisfies the entire market.
If the two railroads behave competitively, however, they will begin cut-
ting prices in order to steal business from each other. Any price above
short-run marginal cost is "profitable" in the sense that it covers the direct
costs of shipping and contributes something to the amortization of the
fixed costs. That is, the railroad would be better off accepting a package
for 55 cents, which would cover its direct costs and contribute 15 cents to
fixed costs, than it would be in not carrying the package at all, even
though 55 cents is not nearly enough to cover all the costs. Such competi-
tion would drive prices to marginal cost, but in the case of the natural
monopoly market, these costs are much lower than total costs. Both rail-
roads would lose money until they formed a cartel and set a very high
price, sufficient to cover their joint fixed costs and variable costs, which
would be at least $2.40 per unit.9 Otherwise, one of the railroads would
be driven out of business, and the monopoly situation would be restored.
Because of the doubling of fixed costs caused by railroad "competition,"
the price of shipping a package could actually rise while both railroads
lost money. Thus, competition is bad for the railroads and often bad for
consumers as well. In the short run, consumers may benefit from very low
rates; but in the long run they will end up bearing the cost of needless
additional capacity. Once the two railroads are built, not even price regu-
lation will help consumers much, because the regulator must set a rate
sufficient to guarantee each railroad a reasonable return, and that rate
will be much higher if there are two railroads than if there is only one.
98. Variable costs would remain constant at 40 cents per unit.
99. It could be substantially more, because demand for the railroads' services will decline in re-
sponse to the higher price, thus raising the fixed costs to more than $2.00 per unit shipped.
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B. Responses
The simple model described above explains virtually every important
phenomenon in the regulatory history of American railroads in the late
19th century.
1. Why the States Tried To Charter Multiple Railroads
Monopoly railroads meant monopoly rates. Within the classical model
of political economy, the first solution to monopoly is not rate regulation
but competition. In a few early cases, states made the expensive mistake of
creating railroad monopolies by charters that granted exclusive rights to
carry cargo or passengers between two named points.100 But states learned
their lessons quickly, and by the mid-19th century the vast majority of
railroad charters contained no monopoly provisions. State legislatures gen-
erally attempted to solve the problem of high railroad rates by creating
more railroads, with the result that railroad routes, particularly along
longer hauls, became increasingly competitive between 1860 and the
1890's."'x The eventual consequences for the railroads were disastrous, for
the reasons suggested by the simple model above.1 "
2. Why Subsidies Were Necessary for Multiple Railroads
An experienced railroad manager did not need an economic model of
natural monopoly to know that competition was bad for the railroad busi-
ness. For this reason, railroads needed to be encouraged to build new
lines, especially if there were other railroads nearby. 0 3 This explains
many of the government subsidies to encourage railroad development in
100. See The New Jersey Monopolies, 104 N. AM. REV. 428 (1867); Cooley, Limits to State Con-
trol of Private Business, 1 PRINCETON REV. (4th s.) 233, 261 (1878); Towles, Early Railroad Mo-
nopoly and Discrimination in Rhode Island, 1835-55, 18 YALE REV. 299 (o.s.) (1909). In addition,
there were a few early decisions that railroad charters implied monopoly rights. E.g., Boston &
L.R.R. v. Salem & L.R.R., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 1, 32-34 (1854). As a matter of federal law, the
Supreme Court held in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837), that a corporate
charter need not imply a monopoly right. However, it consistently upheld explicit monopoly rights
contained in corporate grants. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); In re
Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1865).
101. The Cullom Committee Report, urging passage of what was to become the Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887, assumed that a principal cause of the railroads' financial woes was overdevelop-
ment brought on by state subsidy and other legislative urging. S. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess.
48-51 (1886).
102. Alfred Chandler suggests that railroad overdevelopment resulted not merely from state
growth policy, but also from each railroad's desire to protect itself by controlling lines to every point
in its perceived territory. A. CHANDLER, THE VIsIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 147 (1977).
103. For an examination of the reluctance of railroads to build competing lines in the absence of
state subsidy, see C. GOODRICH, supra note 6, at 238. See also Callender, The Early Transportation
and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the Growth of Corporations, 17 Q.J. EcON.
111, 112 (1902) (arguing subsidies were necessary for railroads to develop in many markets). For a
contemporary economic evaluation of the subsidy policy in one state, see Million, State Aid to Rail-
roads in Missouri, 3 J. POL. ECON. 73 (1894).
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the mid-19th century. The subsidies included free land, subsidized loans
often financed by municipal bonds, or sometimes even outright grants of
cash1 °4 State courts frequently considered the constitutionality of such
subsidies and they approved most of them,105 as did the United States
Supreme Court.106
3. Why the States Regulated First: The Historical Development of the
Rate Regulation Movement
States began to regulate railroad rates some forty years before the fed-
eral government did.10 7 Most of the monopoly rates were charged for
short hauls, which were predominantly intrastate, while most long-haul,
interstate rates were quite low. From the viewpoint of the federal govern-
ment, which had jurisdiction only over interstate shipments, rates seemed
quite competitive, or even so low that they were unremunerative. 0 8
4. Why the Railroads Sought Repeatedly To Cartelize the Freight
Market, and Why the Cartels Did Not Work Well
As noted above,' 09 multiple railroads operating between the same two
points could not make a profit if they behaved competitively. As far as the
railroads were concerned, the solution was not to behave competitively.
Many students of the railroad problem argued that wherever there were
competing railroads, cartelization was inevitable." 0 In no other industry
have attempts at both legal and illegal cartelization been so persistent,
widespread, systematic, or ultimately doomed to failure.
For thirty years, a great debate waged among railroad economists and
policymakers over whether "pooling"-a form of cartelization in which
traffic and income were divided among participating railroads"'-should
104. The best study of such subsidies is C. GOODRICH, supra note 6.
105. For state court decisions striking down railroad subsidies, see People ex rel. Detroit &
H.R.R. v. Township Board, 20 Mich. 452 (1870); Hansen v. Iowa, 27 Iowa 28 (1869); see also Kent,
Municipal Subscriptions and Taxation in Aid of Railroads, 9 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 649 (1870) (favor-
ing subsidies); Payson, Taxation for Railroads by New England Towns, 16 AM. L. REv. 893 (1882)
(arguing against public subsidies and taxation for railroads); W. B. J., County Subscriptions to Rail-
road Corporations, 11 Am. L. REG. 737 (1872) (arguing against subsidies).
106. Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U.S. 332 (1885); City of Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. L.R.R., 110 U.S.
192 (1884) (decided under state law); Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 60 (1881) (state law); Railroad
Co. v. County of Otoe, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 667 (1872) (state law). However, the Supreme Court
occasionally struck down subsidies to industries other than railroads, holding that they violated the
constitutional obligation that tax monies be used for a public purpose. City of Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U.S. 487 (1883); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
107. Eminent railroad legal scholar Isaac Redfield, however, called for federal regulation as early
as 1874. Redfield, Regulation of Interstate Traffic on Railways by Congress, 22 AM. L. REG. (o.s.) 1
(1874).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 261-88.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
110. E.g., Rice, A Remedy for Railway Abuses, 134 N. AM. REv. 134 (1882).
111. On the development of the American pooling system, see Gilchrist, Albert Fink and the
Pooling System, 34 Bus. HisT. Rav. 24 (1960); see also A. CHANDLER, supra note 102, at 122-44.
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be legal. Many prominent economists... and some lawyers informed about
railroad problems. 3 made the case for legal pooling, arguing that it was
essential to the survival of the railroads."" Some went so far as to argue
that "ruinous competition" would destroy the railroads, and that member
railroads who cheated on their pooling agreements should be punished." 5
Shippers were understandably opposed to pooling, and they generally ob-
tained favorable federal legislation. Congress wrote an antipooling provi-
sion into the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and an even stronger provi-
sion into the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910."' The Interstate Commerce
Commission itself was more sympathetic to the plight of the railroads, and
it advocated a certain amount of controlled pooling throughout the
1890's.17 But the economic arguments for pooling became largely aca-
demic after 1897, when the Supreme Court condemned railroad cartels
and pools under the antitrust laws."" Pooling remained strictly forbidden
until it was legalized, subject to Interstate Commerce Commission control,
in the Transportation Act of 1920."'
The complexity of the pooling issue underlines the important difference
between the railroads and most other businesses. The Trans-Missouri
case condemning railroad cartels has been characterized as a reasonable
application of the per se rule in antitrust to a "naked" price-fixing agree-
112. See, e.g., Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law. II, 2 POL. ScI. Q.
369, 389 (1887). Seligman argued that the pools were a good idea because, with price competition
eliminated, the railroads would engage in nonprice competition by striving to better one another in the
provision of "accommodations and facilities." Yale's Arthur Twining Hadley agreed. A. HADLEY,
supra note 70, at 74-79; Hadley, The Prohibition of Railway Pools, 4 Q.J. ECON. 158 (1890); Had-
ley, Railroad Abuses, At Home and Abroad, 2 NEW PRINCETON REV. 355 (1886). Accord W. RIP-
LEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE & ORGANIZATION 575-607 (1915); Hudson, The Southern Railway &
Steamship Association, 5 Q.J. ECON. 70 (1891).
113. One such lawyer was Thomas McIntrye Cooley. See Cooley, Popular and Legal Views of
Traffic Pooling, 27 RAILWAY REV. 15 (1887).
114. See Bacon, Railways and the State, 30 NEW ENGLANDER 713 (1871) (supporting compre-
hensive regulation of railroad companies); Bryce, supra note 92, at 335 (criticizing Interstate Com-
merce Act for having antipooling provision); Bullen, Railroad Cooperation, 13 INT'L REV. 399
(1882) (supporting pooling); Newcomb, The Present Railway Situation, 165 N. AM. REv. 591 (1897)
(arguing that pooling should be legal and controlled by Interstate Commerce Commission); Waite,
supra note 92, at 345-46 (arguing that legalized pooling under control of stronger Commission is
probable solution to then-existing evils).
115. E.g., Garrett, supra note 92; Porter, Railway Rates, 153 N. AM. REv. 718 (1891) (arguing
that pools should be legal but made subject to direct federal supervision, and criticizing recently
passed Interstate Commerce Act for preventing them); see also W. RIPLEY, supra note 112, at 575-76
(arguing for adoption of English system, in which pooling agreements were legally enforceable).
116. Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 547-52 (1910).
117. E.g., ICC ANN. REP. 16-21 (1898); ICC ANN. REP. 13 (1900).
118. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See Miller, The Decision Against Railway Pooling, 167 N. AM.
REV. 752, 757 (1898) ("The decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, is right, while the law is
wrong . . . ."); Newcomb, The Opposition to Railway Pooling, 168 N. AM. REv. 321 (1899) (ap-
proving pooling); Patterson, The Case of the Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 36 AM. L. REG.
(n.s.) 307 (1897) (condemning Court decision); Smith, Railway Pooling and the Interstate Commerce
Commission, 168 N. AM. REv. 506 (1899) (arguing that pooling should be legal but that further ICC
control of it was unnecessary).
119. See infra text accompanying note 284.
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ment-that is, an agreement that has no purpose except to exact monop-
oly prices from consumers.120 Nothing could be further from the truth. In
fact, already in the 1890's, the Commission realized two things about the
railroads that had escaped both Congress and the Supreme Court. First,
in the absence of minimum and maximum rate regulation, pooling was
necessary to preserve the financial integrity of the railroads. Second, the
railroads themselves were engaged in a joint venture that made either pri-
vate coordination or broad legislative control essential.
In upholding the arrangement eventually struck down by the Supreme
Court in Trans-Missouri, the circuit court relied on the conclusion of the
Interstate Commerce Commission that the railroads needed "common au-
thority" to "fix rates, and to provide for their steady maintenance."121
Judge Sanborn noted that merchandise traveling interstate often needed to
be handled by several different railroads. As a result, substantial coopera-
tion among them was necessary. 22 Further, since the transfer problems
were interstate, regulating them was "obviously beyond the reach of com-
pulsory [state] legislation .... .""' The judge concluded:
The fact that the business of railway companies is irretrievably in-
terwoven, that they interchange cars and traffic, that they act as
agents for each other in the delivery and receipt of freight and in
paying and collecting freight charges, and that commodities received
for transportation generally pass through the hands of several carri-
ers, renders it of vital importance to the public that uniform rules
and regulations governing railway traffic should be framed by those
who have a practical acquaintance with the subject, and that they
should be promulgated and faithfully observed. 24
Just as the simple economics of the railroad industry explains why the
industry was so prone to cartelization,125 it also explains why the cartels
120. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 22-26 (1978)
(defending Justice Peckham's brilliant, "pro-consumer" orientation in Trans-Missouri).
121. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58, 76 (8th Cir. 1893) (quoting ICC
ANN. REP. 25 (1889)).
122. In fact, the railroads themselves were responsible for coordinating the first national railroad
system and facilitating the handling of through traffic that required the use of multiple roads. See A.
CHANDLER, supra note 102, at 122-44.
123. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. at 76 (quoting ICC ANN. REP. 3 (1888)). James C.
Carter made this argument before the Supreme Court to no avail. Brief for the Trans-Missouri Asso-
ciation, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
124. 58 F. at 79-80.
125. A substantial body of economic literature argues that in certain industries with very high
fixed costs there is no stable situation under which the firms can be expected to behave competitively.
See Telser, Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency, 28 J.L. ECON. 271 (1985). Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), may have involved such an industry. See Bit-
tlingmayer, Price-Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case, 5 RES. L. & ECON. 57 (1983); Bittlingmayer,
Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. ECON.
201 (1982). The theory, if sound, tends to confirm the beliefs of Progressive Era economists that
cartelization or consolidation was inevitable in a wide variety of heavy industries, not merely the
railroads. See M. SHUBIK, A GAME-THEORETC APPROACH TO POLmICAL ECONOMY 360 (1984); L.
1988] 1041
The Yale Law Journal
worked so poorly, particularly in areas of railroad overdevelopment. The
rate set by the cartel, which was designed to cover both fixed and variable
costs, was so large when compared to short-run marginal cost, that a great
deal of room remained for shaving prices to obtain more business. If a
railroad could secretly obtain a large shipment at any price higher than its
direct operating costs, it could pay the balance to its stockholders. As a
result, cheating by cartel members was widespread. The two most com-
mon mechanisms were secret rebates given to large shippers in exchange
for their business, generally called "personal" discrimination,"2 6 and in-
tentional misclassification of freight.127
The effect of widespread cheating was that "real" freight rates through-
out the system were substantially lower than posted freight rates. Fre-
quently, cheating scandals would erupt, railroads would publicly defect
from a cartel or pooling arrangement, and there would be a protracted
rate war in which all the railroads lost money until the cartel was once
again restored.128 Overall, cartelization of the American railroad industry
proved to be an unsuccessful way of controlling rates.1 29
5. Why the Railroads Consolidated
The most efficient way to eliminate competition among railroads was to
eliminate competition for profits altogether, and thereby destroy all incen-
tives for cheating. The desire to eliminate competition for profits explains
the great railroad merger movement that began in the 1880's and trans-
formed America's network of hundreds of small railroads into a half
dozen giant systems by the 1920's.1O The tendency of competing railroads
to merge was understood by railway economists as early as 1871, when
Charles Francis Adams, Jr. argued that consolidation was inevitable in
the presence of competition, but that government control was necessary to
TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE (1978); Aivazian & Callen, The Coase Theorem and
the Empty Core, 24 J.L. ECON. 175 (1981).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 164-68.
127. For example, if the first class rate, reserved for fine products such as finished textiles or
furniture, was 25 cents per unit, while the fourth class rate for unfinished lumber was 12 cents per
unit, the railroad and a large shipper might enter into an agreement under which the furniture would
be intentionally misclassified as "lumber," thus qualifying for the lower rate. The Hepburn Act of
1906, Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906), contained a strong antirebate provision that made it illegal for a
railroad to grant a rebate or for a shipper to receive one. However, there was no federal legislation
controlling freight classifications. As a result, after 1906, freight misclassification became the preferred
mechanism for giving individual rate preferences to large shippers. See G. KOLKO, supra note 9, at
169; W. RIPLEY, supra note 12, at 190. Large shippers were much more likely to obtain the benefit
of such cheating than smaller shippers because the trade-offs to the railroad were much more attrac-
tive: the chances of getting caught by other members of the pool were no greater for the large shipper
than the small one, but the rewards were much larger.
128. See J. GRODINSKY, THE IOWA POOL: A STUDY IN RAILROAD COMPETITION: 1870-84, at
53-67 (1950); W. RIPLEY, supra note 12, at 251.
129. For an economic analysis of why the railroad trunk line cartels were unsuccessful, see P.
MAcAvoY, supra note 26.
130. See Martin, supra note 38, at 371. For a complete account, see W. RIPLEY, supra note 112,
at 412-33.
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prevent monopoly pricing.1"1 Others argued that consolidation was neces-
sary for the efficient operation of the railroads." 2
A great deal has been made of the impact of the American antitrust
laws in causing this merger movement."3 The argument is that because
elimination of competition was essential to survival, and since the Su-
preme Court made all forms of cartelization illegal under the Sherman
Act, the only alternative left was merger. In the case of the railroads,
however, it seems relatively clear that the loose combinations134 were not
working,135 and they would have taken advantage of tighter forms of or-
ganization whether or not the Sherman Act was applied to them. At most,
the Trans-Missouri"3 6 and Joint Traffic3 7 decisions encouraged railroads
to merge somewhat more quickly.
6. Why the Railroads Were in a Sorry State in the 1890's
The simple economics of railroads explains why by 1895, when overde-
velopment of railroads in the United States was at its worst, one-fourth of
American railroads assets were in receivership.1"8 It also explains why the
great railroad consolidations probably would have occurred whether or
not the Supreme Court had used the Sherman Act to deal the final death
blow to railroad pools.13 '
By the 1870's or 1880's, many of the unique features of railroad eco-
131. Adams, The Government and the Railroad Corporations, 112 N. AM. REV. 31 (1871).
Making essentially the same arguments at the same time is Bacon, Railways and the State, 30 NEw
ENGLANDER 713 (1871); see also Dixon, Railroads in Their Corporate Relations, 23 Q.J. EcoN. 34
(1908) (discussing causes of railroad amalgamation, methods of control, intercorporate relationships,
public opposition to holding companies, and suggested remedies).
132. E.g., Comment, Railway Rate Regulation, 13 YALE REV. 341, 343 (1905) (consolidation has
gone long way toward curbing personal discrimination); Bryce, supra note 92, at 334; Gibbon, Rail-
road Consolidation, 154 N. AM. REV. 251 (1892); Huntington, A Plea for Railway Consolidation,
153 N. Am. REV. 272 (1891). Collis P. Huntington was President of the Southern Pacific Railroad.
One major debate was between Russel Sage, who argued that consolidations were bad for consumers
because they yielded monopoly pricing, and James A. Hill, president of the Great Northern Railroad,
who contended that they yielded lower prices through increased efficiency. Compare Sage, Industrial
and Railroad Consolidations: L A Grave Danger to the Community, 172 N. AM. REV. 641 (1901)
with Hill, Industrial and Railroad Consolidations: II. Their Advantages to the Community, 172 N.
AM. REV. 646 (1901).
133. See, e.g., A. CHANDLER, supra note 102, at 315-39; N. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER
MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904, at 159-86 (1985); 1 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 12,
at 33; cf. Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J.L. ECON. 77
(1985).
134. Loose combinations were those, such as pools or freight associations, that did not involve the
joining of the companies' assets into a single firm.
135. They may have been more effective in other industries where consolidation occurred in re-
sponse to antitrust condemnation of cartels. See N. LAMOREAUX, supra note 133, at 159-86.
136. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
137. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
138. Crowell, Railway Receiverships in the United States: Their Origin and Development, 7
YALE REV. 319, 319 (1898) (noting that in 1895, one of every four dollars worth of railway securities
was controlled by receivers); see also Brief for Freemont, Elkhorn and Missouri Valley R.R., United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (reporting 169 railroads in receivership
in 1894).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 130-37.
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nomics described above were well known to economists.14 By the 1890's,
they were known much more broadly; even the "Great Commoner," Wil-
liam Jennings Bryan, understood them. In his 1898 argument to the Su-
preme Court defending a Nebraska rate regulation statute, he described
the peculiar economics of the railroad industry to the Court and explained
why the construction of competing lines was not a suitable alternative to
rate regulation for determining reasonable rates. Under competition, he
argued, fixed costs, and thus total costs, are higher. 4
The question was what to do about these problems. If the railroads
were permitted to have unregulated monopolies, rate gouging and large
monopoly profits at the expense of carriers were sure to result. On the
other hand, if the railroads were forced to compete with each other and
pooling or other forms of cartelization were strictly forbidden, railroad
rates would almost certainly be driven to a level too low to cover fixed
costs, eventually forcing railroads into bankruptcy. The railroad interests
seemed destined to be either filthy rich or perpetually broke.
Finally, and most importantly, the simple economic model explains the
origin of rate discrimination, which became the most important and con-
troversial problem of railroad regulatory policy in the Gilded Age and
after, and the rationales for different and ultimately inconsistent state and
federal responses. Following the treatment in Section III of the problem of
rate discrimination, Section IV takes up the problem of the disparate fed-
eral and state approaches to rate discrimination. It examines the unique
problems generated by a federalist approach to railroad regulation and
their ultimate resolution as the national government began to assert, with
Supreme Court sanction, increasing power over the railroads.
III. UNJUST DISCRIMINATION
Rate discrimination is a difference in rates between two shipments dis-
proportionate to differences in the cost of service. If the same carrier
charges 3 cents per mile for a certain volume of freight between points A
and B, but only 2 cents per mile between points A and C, it discriminates
140. See, e.g., C. Adams, The Railroad System, supra note 2, at 363-66; A. HADLEY, supra note
70, at 63-74; Adams, supra note 131; Bacon, Railways and the State, 30 NEw ENGLANDER 713
(1871); Cooley, Popular and Legal View of Traffic Pooling, 28 Railway Rev. 15 (1887); Hadley,
Private Monopolies and Public Rights, 1 Q.J. ECON. 28 (1886); Hadley, The Prohibition of Railway
Pools, 4 Q.J. ECON. 158 (1890); Hadley, The Workings of the Interstate Commerce Law, 2 Q.J.
ECON. 162 (1888); Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Commission. 1, 2 POL.
Sci. Q. 223, 223-27 (1887); Taussig, A Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates, 5 Q.J. ECoN.
438 (1891); see also H. NEWCOMB, RAILWAY ECONOMIscs 55-88 (1898). By the early 20th century a
large literature had arisen on the question of the relationship between competition and railroad rates.
See Agger, Monopoly and Competitive Prices, 3 AM. ECON. REV. 589 (1913); Brown, The Basis of
Rate-Making as Affected by Competition Versus Combinations of Railroads, 16 YALE REV. (o.s.) 79
(1907); Clark, Some Neglected Phases of Rate Regulation: Fluctuating Prices and the Earnings of
Capital, 4 AM. ECON. REV. 565 (1914).
141. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 493-94 (1898). Bryan lost the case; the Supreme Court
found the Nebraska rate confiscatory.
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among freight according to the distance shipped. A carrier can also dis-
criminate by charging different rates for different types of freight or to
different shippers of the same freight along the same route. During the
Gilded Age, rate discrimination was widespread and considered by the
railroads to be inherent in the rate-making process. It was widely con-
demned by critics.
The common law subjected common carrier rates to the general re-
quirement that they be "reasonable," and the presence or absence of dis-
crimination could be a factor in determining reasonableness. As early as
the 17th century, the common law had derived the duty to charge reasona-
ble rates from the common carrier's obligation to serve everyone; it could
not escape this duty simply by quoting an undesired shipper a rate that
was much higher than the rate offered to others.1 42
At first glance, the common law seems to be an important weapon
against rate discrimination. Within the classical theory of federalism, it
had one distinct advantage over state legislation: extraterritorial reach.
Before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins1 43 undermined the federal judicial no-
tion of a general common law, the commerce clause did not substantially
limit state common law adjudication of rates in interstate commerce. Fed-
eral preemption did not occur until it came by way of statute144-the In-
terstate Commerce Act of 1887-and even then the Act only preempted
specific transactions. In an important decision involving the telegraph in-
dustry,145 the Court held that a state could apply its common law to an
interstate rate, because, quoting Chancellor Kent, "[t]he common law in-
cludes those principles. . . which do not rest for their authority upon any
express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. 1 46 To hold
otherwise, Justice Brewer concluded, would effectively exempt interstate
transactions from any regulation whatsoever unless the federal govern-
ment had passed a statute on the subject.1 47 The Court concluded that
"the principles of the common law are operative upon all interstate com-
mercial transactions except so far as they are modified by Congressional
enactment. ' 148 The states retained the ability to regulate interstate dis-
142. See Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. 327 (1683) (common carrier could not refuse to carry pack
when tendered reasonable compensation).
143. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (declaring that common law of forum state should determine law to be
applied in diversity cases).
144. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 38 Tex. App. 366, 85 S.W. 1052 (1905),
rev'd, 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act preempted
the common law with respect to interstate rates. It did not hold that the state lacked the jurisdiction to
apply the common law rule to an interstate rate.
145. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1901); see also Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406 (1910).
146. 181 U.S. at 101 (quoting I J. KENT, COMMENTARIS 471 (4th ed. 1840)).
147. Id. at 102.
148. Id.
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crimination by common law, even though under the Wabash Railway de-
cision"" they were unable to do so by statute.
But the common law was not consistently applied, and its strictures on
rates usually were insubstantial. The only rule applied with anything ap-
proaching uniformity was that a railroad could not charge two different
rates to two different shippers for precisely the same shipment-that is,
the same quantity of the same cargo between the same two points."' 0
Many courts held that even when the two shipments were in all respects
identical, the fact that the plaintiff was charged more than someone else
could be used only as evidence that the higher rate was unreasonable; it
did not conclusively establish unreasonableness.15' Further, if there was
even a slight difference in the articles, the amount shipped, or the route,
the common law generally permitted the discrimination.' 52 As a result of
these limitations, the common law was never effectively applied to short-
haul/long-haul discrimination. 3
Nearly every person who wrote about railroads in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century, from Progressive muckrakers like Ida Tarbell"54
and Frank Norris 55 to stuffy formalists like Harvard Law School profes-
sor Joseph Beale, 5 ' railed at the widespread practice of rate discrimina-
tion.' 5 Rate discrimination in the Gilded Age consisted of three general
kinds, all of which were the subject of extensive criticism.
A. Preferred Customers
Most scorned and least defended were preferential rates for large fa-
vored customers, the most notorious being John D. Rockefeller's Standard
149. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); see infra text accompanying
notes 241-43.
150. E.g., Cook v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 81 Iowa 551, 46 N.W. 1080 (1890); Messenger v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 36 N.J.L. 407 (Sup. Ct. 1872).
151. Johnson v. Pensacola & P.R.R., 16 Fla. 623 (1878); Hoover v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 Pa.
220, 27 A. 282 (1893).
152. E.g., Fitchburg R.R. Co. v. Gage, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 393 (1859) (legal for railroad to
charge different rates for ice and brick along the same routes); Commonwealth v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 113 Ky. 759, 68 S.W. 1103 (1902) (legal to charge different rates for different grades of
coal).
153. See J. BEALE & B. WYMAN, THE LAW OF RAILROAD RATE REGULATION WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO AMERICAN LEGISLATION § 851 (1907) (suggesting that it might be false imprison-
ment to force passenger who had paid for long haul to get off earlier at higher cost destination, but
finding no common law cases). The best brief summary of the common law position, citing many
cases, is 4 B. ELLIOTr & W. ELLIOTr, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RAILROADS 2283-85 (1st ed.
1897).
154. 1 I. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 44-49 (1904); see also
Rice, supra note 110 (arguing that only solution for discrimination and other abuses was government
ownership of railroads).
155. F. NORRIS, supra note 72, at 67-68; see infra text accompanying notes 174-75.
156. J. BEALE & B. WYMAN, supra note 153, §§ 749-750.
157. See also Lord, A Brief Review of the Subject of Federal Railroad Regulation, 181 N. AM.
REv. 754 (1905).
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Oil Company."'8 Even conservative, relatively pro-railroad economists
such as Yale's Arthur Twining Hadley abhorred such "personal discrimi-
nation." '59 Three phemenona may explain the use of such discrimination.
First, lower rates for very large shippers may not have been discrimina-
tory at all, but merely reflective of the lower cost of selling in large vol-
ume. For example, carload lots could be handled much more cheaply than
smaller lots that required the railroads to "break bulk," and carload lots
accordingly received a lower rate. But the record of discriminatory pricing
in favor of Standard Oil and other large shippers is substantial and
reveals far more than economies of scale in shipping.60
Second, preferred rates for certain shippers may have reflected the fact
that many of the railroads were vertically integrated firms, with interests
in coal, timber, or other commodities. They often gave their own parent or
subsidiary firms preferred rates. Section one of the Hepburn Act of
1906161 attempted to solve this problem, with some overkill,"62 by forbid-
ding vertically integrated railroads from transporting commodities in
which they had an interest. 63
The third and most the important cause of discrimination in favor of
preferred customers was the use of "secret rebates"'" or improper freight
classifications, which resulted when a member of a railroad pool or other
cartel cheated on its fellow cartel members by shaving the cartel price in
order to capture a large sale.'65 Such cheating made the cartels particu-
larly unstable. 6 Nevertheless, secret rebates were widely condemned by
158. See generally I. TARBELL, supra, note 154. See also Lloyd, Story of a Great Monopoly, 47
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 317, 322 (1881) (telling how Standard Oil Company entered into agreements
with railroads under which they would charge higher rates to Standard's competitors); see also
Scofield v. Railway Co., 43 Ohio St. 571, 3 N.E. 907 (1885) (condemning agreements under which
Standard Oil Company obtained rates lower than competitors).
159. See A. HADLEY, supra note 70, at 119-21.
160. See I. TARBELL, supra note 154.
161. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
162. See Hill, Recent Utterances of Mr. Hill and Mr. Harriman Upon Railway Problems, 14 J.
POL. ECON. 627 (1906) (noting that statute was interpreted to prevent railroads from owning stock of
any industry along road, because such industry would likely want to ship on closest available line); see
also Dixon, The Interstate Commerce Act as Amended, 21 Q.J. EcoN. 22 (1906) (concluding that
provision was radical, but easy to enforce).
163. In United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1908), the Supreme Court
interpreted the clause narrowly, holding that a railroad that had made a bona fide sale of commodities
before shipment no longer had an interest in them and could ship them. Of course, if rate preferences
were being granted, they would show up in the commodity purchase price. For contemporary analysis
of the problem of rate discrimination by vertically integrated railroads, see E. JONES, THE ANTHRA-
CITE COAL COMBINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1914).
164. See Scofield v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 43 Ohio St. 571, 3 N.E. 907 (1885) (condemning
secret rebates given to Standard Oil Company); Cook v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Railway., 81 Iowa 551,
46 N.W. 1080 (1890) (condemning secret rebates). Many of the rebates were given to large shippers
in exchange for agreements that the shippers would ship all their freight or at least a specified large
amount on the railroad in question. E.g., Louisville, E. & St. L. Consol. R.R. v. Wilson, 132 Ind.
517, 32 N.E. 311 (1892).
165. For the economics of such cheating, see H. HovENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW § 4.1 (1985).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 109-26.
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Progressives such as Ida Tarbell for enhancing the economic power of
large shippers like Standard Oil,16 7 even though their effect almost cer-
tainly undermined the railroad cartels, which the Progressives also
abhorred."' 8
B. Preferred Products
Another form of discrimination, widely practiced but less widely criti-
cized, was the use of rate differentials between different products. Fin-
ished cotton goods, for example, were sent in the highest rate classifica-
tion, while lumber and coal were sent in the lowest. The differences in
rates between these classes were substantial, and often the lowest rates
were not sufficient to pay the average total costs of operation-that is, the
sum of variable costs and a pro rata share of capital costs. 69 As a result,
the railroads were sometimes accused of using artificially high rates on
first class goods to "subsidize" low rates on cheaper goods.
However, in 1885, Hadley already had demonstrated that this reason-
ing was fallacious. Any rate higher than average variable cost contributed
to the fund needed to pay fixed costs, and thus tended to reduce rates for
other products.11 As a result, shippers of first class goods benefited if the
railroads shipped fourth class goods at any rate higher than direct operat-
ing costs, even if the difference in rate for the two classes of goods was not
justified by differences in cost of service. As Hadley persuasively argued,
the discrimination benefited everyone. The railroads could not give every-
one the same low rate, because they would not recover fixed as well as
variable costs. They could not charge the lumber and coal dealers the
higher rate, because the dealers would not be able to pay it. If they
charged the same rate for all products, lumber and coal dealers, first class
shippers, and railroads would all be worse off.
Bona-fide discrimination on the basis of freight classification was the
least controversial form of rate discrimination,171 although it was criticized
by those who defended "cost of service" rather than "value of service"
rate-making. 17 2 Even Congress recognized that such discrimination was
sometimes essential.1'7  Neither customer discrimination nor product dis-
crimination, however, raised the fundamental issues of federalism present
in discrimination between short, generally intrastate hauls and long, gen-
erally interstate hauls.
167. See I. TARBELL, supra note 154.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 111-22.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
170. A. HADLEY, supra note 70, at 112-13.
171. The problem of intentional misclassification of freight was less controversial. See supra text
accompanying notes 164-65.
172. See Taussig, supra note 140; Clark, supra note 140; see also supra text accompanying notes
126-30.
173. See S. REP. No. 46, supra note 101, at 184-94.
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C. The Central Problem of Federalism: Short-Haul/Long-Haul
Discrimination
In The Octopus, Frank Norris' muckraking antirailroad novel of 1901,
Harran Derrick, a rancher from Bonneville, California, in the San Joa-
quin valley, orders a set of plows from the East. One day while talking
casually to the Bonneville railroad freight agent, Harran finds out that his
plows are aboard a train standing in the station. Harran is pleased, be-
cause that means he can begin plowing immediately. But the agent tells
Harran he cannot have the plows, for "the cars are going north, not, as
you thought, comingfrom the north. They have not been to San Francisco
yet." The agent then patiently explains-undoubtedly for the thousandth
time that year-that the plows must be shipped from the East to San
Francisco and then back to Bonneville, even though the train bound for
San Francisco passes through Bonneville. Furthermore, it costs more to
ship the plows back the short distance from San Francisco to Bonneville
than to ship them all the way across the country, and Harran must pay
the sum of the two rates. When Harran expresses his disgust about the
"whole dirty business," the agent shrugs. "I am willing to do what I can
for you. I'll hurry the plows through, but I can't change the freight regu-
lation of the road. '17
4
For Frank Norris, the story about railroad rates was part of a much
larger point. The railroad was impersonal, and it gobbled up fortunes and
destroyed the lives of one group of people while it enriched others, all
apparently without reason. All these things may have been true, but there
probably was a very good reason for the railroad's rate policy. It was
designed to take advantage of the fact that San Francisco was a competi-
tive railroad shipping point, while Bonneville, California was a monopoly
point.
Short-haul/long-haul discrimination occurred when a railroad charged
a higher price per mile for a short haul than it did for a long one. Once
again, some difference in pricing between short and long hauls was non-
discriminatory. For example, loading and unloading of cars must be done
once for both short and long hauls and generally costs the same whether
the distance traveled is ten miles or one thousand. As a result, no one
would expect that a railroad that was willing to load, unload, and ship a
cargo 1000 miles for 3 cents per mile would be willing to do the same
thing for a haul of fifty miles.
More often than not, however, the rate differentials between long and
short hauls were far out of proportion to actual direct costs. Further, if
short hauls had merely cost proportionately more than long hauls, the
voices of complaint in the Gilded Age would undoubtedly have been much
174. F. NORRIS, supra note 72, at 67-68.
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more muted. The biggest protest against short-haul/long-haul discrimina-
tion arose from the fact that short hauls frequently cost absolutely more
than long hauls, even though the short haul was contained completely
within the long-haul route. For example, a shipment from Denver to
Peoria, Illinois, might cost more than a shipment from San Francisco to
New York, even though the cargo bound from San Francisco to New
York passed through both Denver and Peoria on the way. Such discrimi-
nation was considered appalling by both liberal critics and conservative
legal writers, and many late 19th century legal writers who wrote on the
subject castigated the practice of "unjust" short-haul/long-haul discrimi-
nation.17 A few political economists attempted to defend the principle," 6
but for their trouble they were identified as nothing more than mouth-
pieces for the railroad interests. Even later, historians in the Progressive
tradition found such rate discrimination abusive, and denounced both the
railroads and those who defended it.1"
Today, many regulators and consumers have a different perspective on
short-haul/long-haul discrimination. For example, most of us accept will-
ingly that a flight from San Francisco to New York costs $119.00, while a
flight from Ogden, Utah, to Cedar Rapids, Iowa-one-fourth the dis-
tance-costs twice as much. Competition rather than cost determines the
rate.
By the late 1860's, railroad economists began to discern an economic
basis for short-haul/long-haul rate discrimination. In a paper presented to
the newly founded American Social Science Association in 1869,178 Joseph
Potts, president of the Empire Transportation Company, observed that
railroad lines between distant points were far more competitive than peo-
ple once thought, because variable costs were so small. Since the compet-
ing lines connected the same commercial "centres of commerce" but
175. See H. BARNES, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION §§ 111-119 (1910); N. COLLIER, PUBLIC
SERVICE COMPANIES §§ 125-132 (1918); W. COOK, STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS AND GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW § 674 (2d ed. 1889); 1 N. FETTER, CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS §§ 259-274
(1897); R. HUTCHINSON, THE LAW OF CARRIERS § 297 (F. Mechem, 2d ed. 1891); F. JUDSON, THE
LAW OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND ITS FEDERAL REGULATION §§ 172-218 (1905); 2 & 3 D.
MOORE, MOORE ON CARRIERS 704-26, 1757-1901 (1914); W. NOYES, AMERICAN RAILROAD
RATES 89-123 (1905); E. PIERCE, THE LAW OF RAILROADS 498-99 (1881); PRENTICE & EGAN,
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 284-94 (1898); 3 J. PURDY, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§
1033-1036 (1905); W. SNYDER, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAWS 89-106 (1904); 4 S. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§§ 5548-5549 (1895); 2 B. WYMAN, WYMAN ON PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS §§ 1310-1338
(1911); see also H. FULLER, THE ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE CONSTRUED BY THE SUPREME
COURT 227-59 (1915); 1 J. LACEY, A DIGEST OF RAILWAY DECISIONS 182-83 (1875); Hamilton,
Discriminative Traffic Rates, 16 AM. L. REV. 818 (1882); see also Hamilton, Extortionate Traffic
Rates, 16 AM. L. REV. 446 (1882).
176. See, e.g., A. HADLEY, infra text accompanying notes 185-87.
177. E.g., C. DEGLER, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION: 1876-1900, at 27-28 (1977).
178. Potts, The Science of Transportation, 1 (no. 2) J. Soc. SC. 115 (1870). Potts' paper was
given in October 1869.
1050 [Vol. 97: 1017
Regulatory Conflict
passed through different points en route, competition for traffic between
the centres was far greater than competition for points along the way:
Usually, additional lines, while they seek the same large centres of
commerce, reach them through different districts. This confines their
competition to the trade of such centres, while the traffic of the coun-
try peculiar to each line is not only uncompeted for, but subjected to
an extra and often oppressive tax in order to restore the revenue
depletions which each road suffers in its violent struggles with the
others for jointly accessible business. 1
It cost only a little more to ship a package from points A to B by an
indirect 600 mile route than by a 300 mile straight line. If one should
trace out the possible rail routes from, say, St. Louis to Chicago, one
might find as many as sixty possibilities. This simple observation-that
lines did not have to be substantially "parallel" in order to compete-lay
at the crux of the short-haul/long-haul problem. It also helped explain
why railroad pooling worked so badly. Most shippers did not care if their
traffic from St. Louis to Chicago went by way of Peoria or even St. Paul;
they cared only about what they paid. As a result, in the absence of carte-
lization, the railroad market from St. Louis to Chicago operated as close
to perfect competition as any market one could find."' For that reason,
the rates between major terminal points were generally driven to marginal
cost, considerably less than the rate that would permit the railroad to
amortize its capital costs.
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., a champion railroad regulator,"" conceded
in 1870 that competition among railroads was a "dangerous evil. . . .It
disturbs every calculation, vitiates every result, puts a stop to all experi-
ment, destroys all system."1"2 By the early twentieth century, it was well
known that indirect routes between two points frequently had an eco-
nomic advantage over direct routes between the same two points for the
simple reason that the railroads stopped at more towns on the longer
routes. As a result, they were in a better position to fill their cars than
they would be on the direct route, and the cost of traveling with less than
a full load often outweighed the cost of going extra miles."8'
Where there was no competition, on the other hand, railroads set a rate
sufficient to cover both their variable and fixed costs-and those fixed
179. Id. at 124.
180. See Lansing, supra note 67, at 466:
Markets that are common to various points of production or supply control the rates from all
these points by the competition which may exist with any one of them. The lowest rate to the
market by any route, controls the rates by all the other routes.
181. See T. MCCRAW, supra note 11, at 1-56.
182. Adams, Railway Problems in 1869, 110 N. AM. REv. 116, 133-34 (1870).
183. Brown, The Competition of Transportation Companies, 4 AM. ECON. REV. 771, 771-76
(1914).
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costs that were not covered by the rates on long-haul traffic were covered
by the short-haul rates. This created the perception that the high short-
haul rates somehow "subsidized" the long-haul rates. For example, even
railroad manager Joseph Potts characterized the high short-haul rates as
an "oppressive tax" designed to "restore the revenue depletions" that ac-
crued from excessive competition on long hauls.184
In fact there was no subsidy, provided that long-haul rates exceeded
direct operating costs, which they almost always did. As Hadley explained
in 1885, even the shippers who paid the high local freight rates actually
benefited from short-haul/long-haul discrimination. Hadley's argument,
which was well known to later railroad economists, 185 was essentially
correct.
Suppose, he argued, that suppliers of oysters at point X on the Dela-
ware coast wanted to enlarge their market by shipping oysters to Philadel-
phia. The market price in Philadelphia was such that the oysters could
not profitably be shipped if shipping costs exceeded one dollar per hun-
dred pounds. The only railroad between point X and Philadelphia ini-
tially agreed to ship the oysters at that rate, provided that the shippers
could fill a car on a regular basis. However, the shippers from point X
were able to supply only a half carload at a time. The railroad could not
profitably ship a half carload at the one dollar price, and the shippers
could not afford to pay more. It initially appeared that the railroad and
the shippers would be unable to do business. However, another possibility
appeared:
At some distance beyond X, the terminus of this railroad, was an-
other oyster-growing place, Y, which sent its oysters to market by
another route. The supply at Y was very much greater than at X.
The people at Y were paying a dollar a hundred to send their oys-
ters to market. It would hardly cost twenty-five cents to send them
from Y to X. If, then, the railroad from X to Philadelphia charged
but seventy-five cents a hundred on oysters which came from Y, it
could easily fill its car full.18
Immediately, of course, the shippers from X complained that oysters
originating at Y were charged a lower rate for the same distance than the
rate for oysters originating at X, but Hadley gave the obvious response:
the lower rate for the shippers from Y made the rate for shippers from X
possible. If the railroad attempted to charge more to the Y shippers, they
would not ship, for they had a competitive alternative. If the Y shippers
184. See supra note 179.
185. See, e.g., W. RIPLEY, supra note 12, at 217-20 (recounting and exploring complexity of
Hadley's argument); see also Meyer, Government Regulation of Railway Rates, 7 PUBLICATIONS
AM. EcoN. A. 69 (1906).
186. A. HADLEY, supra note 70, at 117.
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did not ship, the rate from X would become unprofitable, because even
the lower rate from Y was contributing enough to operating costs to make
the addition of the oyster car profitable. As a result, the shippers at X
were actually better off under the rate discrimination scheme than they
would have been in the absence of discrimination, for without discrimina-
tion there would have been no shipments at all.
In a seminal contribution to the development of regulatory economics in
1891, F.W. Taussig explained in more technical terms why price discrim-
ination was important for natural monopoly industries with high fixed
costs. 187 Taussig began with the observation, already well known in the
economics literature on railroads,1 " that rates under competition were a
function of variable, or operating, costs, not of fixed costs."8 ' Nevertheless,
fixed costs must be paid. As a result, the railroads were an industry sub-
ject to "joint" costs, only one of which would be calculated into price in a
competitive situation. If fixed costs were not accounted for, the railroads
would be unprofitable, and there would be no new investment in them. 90
But since the competitive pricing mechanism did not allocate anything to
contribute to fixed costs, how should they be accounted for in rate-mak-
ing? Taussig concluded that the notion of "cost of service" had no mean-
ing apart from the variable costs incurred in performing that particular
service. As a result, there was no cost-based mechanism for determining
how fixed costs should be allocated in railroad rates. From this Taussig
concluded that value of service rather than cost of service would be the
most efficient mechanism for allocating fixed costs, because it would maxi-
mize the amount of traffic on the railroads. 91 Those who are able to pay
more should pay more. Taussig reasoned that price discrimination based
on freight classifications was economically sound,19 2 as was geographic
discrimination based on the amount of competition along a particular
route. "1 3 Such discrimination was efficient when it permitted things to be
shipped that would not be shipped otherwise. In short, the most efficient
policy was to encourage the largest amount of shipping of all kinds of
187. Taussig, supra note 140. The same argument was developed further a generation later by
John Maurice Clark. See Clark, supra note 140.
188. See, e.g., A. HADLEY, supra note 70, at 264-65 (fixed charges do not directly affect rates but
costs of service do); Hadley, Private Monopolies and Public Rights, 1 Q.J. ECON. 28, 35 (1886); see
also M. KIRKMAN, RAILWAY REVENUE: A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATON OF RAILROADS AND
THE COLLECTION OF RAILWAY RECEIPTS (1879).
189. For a simple model and explanation of this phenomenon, see supra text accompanying notes
93-99.
190. Taussig, supra note 140, at 442.
191. Id. at 458. Edwin Seligman made a similar argument. Seligman, supra note 140, at 230-31.
Taking issue with Taussig and Seligman is Hammond, Railway Rate Theories of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 25 Q.J. ECON. 1, 279, 471 (1910-11). See also Lorenz, Cost and Value of Service
in Railroad Rate-Making, 30 Q.J. ECoN. 205 (1916) (arguing that more emprical data must be
obtained before value of service rate-making could be proved superior).
192. Taussig, supra note 140, at 454.
193. Id.
19881 1053
The Yale Law Journal
products, even if they had to be shipped at widely disparate rates. This
would permit fixed costs to be amortized over the largest possible amount
of cargo and, thus, would tend to lower freight rates overall. Taussig con-
cluded that the railroads' existing rate-making practices were generally
efficient.
According to the Taussig formulation, in an efficient railroad system,
intrastate short-haul rates would always be substantially higher than in-
terstate trunk line rates. But state legislators were generally more inter-
ested in the relative size of the intrastate rates paid by their shipper con-
stituencies than in the efficiency of the national railroad system. State and
federal concerns were inherently inimical to one another. The problem of
competing regulatory structures would ultimately be resolved in favor of
the national legislature, as Congress, with the eventual imprimatur of the
Supreme Court, moved to save the financially troubled railroads from the
provincial interests of individual states.
IV. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SHORT-
HAUL/LONG-HAUL-DISCRIMINATION
The most important problem of federalism posed by market failure in
the railroad industry is illustrated by Figure One, which shows part of a
railroad traveller's map in 1879.94
194. RAND MCNALLY & Co., NEW RAILROAD MAP, FROM THE ATLANTIC COAST TO THE
ROCKY MOUNTAINS (1879). This map was selected more or less at random. The degree of railroad
development in the United States varied considerably by location, and development at any given time
generally was less intensive in the West. Almost any regional map will provide the necessary back-
ground for a discussion of short-haul/long-haul rate discrimination.
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By the late 1870's the United States had a large, impressive network of
railroads. By the 1880's, many people-particularly those within the in-
dustry-believed there was severe overbuilding of railroad trackage. The
impact of this overbuilding on a particular shipment, however, depended
greatly on two factors: the relationship between the departure and desti-
nation points and a large commercial center, and the distance that the
shipment was to be sent.
Railroad competition for traffic to and from large commercial centers
was keen, but frequently it was nonexistent for small, isolated towns. Fur-
thermore, the longer the route, the more alternatives. For example, some-
one shipping from St. Louis, Missouri, to Chicago, Illinois, had a choice
of many different routes. Even someone shipping to Chicago from Omaha,
Nebraska, had a wide variety of alternative routes, notwithstanding the
fact that Nebraska was relatively underdeveloped. On the other hand,
someone shipping from one small town to another-for example, from
Galesburg to Quincy, or from Hopkins to Creston-would have only a
single alternative. Likewise, someone shipping even to Chicago from a
nearby smaller town, such as Bloomington or La Salle, would have only
one or two alternatives, while more remote towns had several. Within a
particular state, many rates were noncompetitive. Interstate traffic, on the
other hand, was almost always quite competitive.
The railroads' response to this situation was predictable. First, they at-
tempted repeatedly to cartelize the competitive, generally interstate, part
of the railroad market. However, the cartels almost always fell apart, and
the result was a series of vicious rate wars throughout the 1880's and
1890's.195 When the railroads were forced to compete, they slashed prices
and lost money on the competitive longer hauls. In 1886, railroad bank-
ruptcy lawyer William P. Shinn observed that "It]he rate wars which
have of late years so devastated the finances of railroad companies, are all
inaugurated and carried on upon inter-state traffic."'1 96 But the railroads
refused to make equivalent price cuts for short hauls between points
where they had a monopoly. On the contrary, they charged a monopoly
price for traffic on those routes and were commonly thought to be subsi-
dizing their low rates on the longer routes by charging higher rates on the
shorter routes.
As Figure One illustrates, one result of this situation was that the fed-
eral problem of railroad regulation was perceived quite differently from
the state problem. The federal government's authority to regulate inter-
state commerce gave it jurisdiction over interstate railroad rates, where the
departure and destination points were in two different states. Until well
195. See supra text accompanying notes 109-29.
196. Shinn, The Relations of Railways to the State, 26 RAILWAY REv. 121,122 (1886) (emphasis
added).
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into the 20th century, the prevailing understanding was that the federal
government had no jurisdiction over rates on intrastate shipments-those
where the bill of lading showed departure and destination points in the
same state.197 The interstate shipping market, which consisted of longer
hauls, tended to be very competitive.
By looking exclusively at federal railroad regulation, writers such as
Gabriel Kolko198 concluded that the principal purpose and effect of rate
regulation in the United States was the protection of the railroads from
competition. But such protection was necessary for the continued viability
of a national railroad system, particularly given the fact of state regulation
that did not take the existence of interstate competition into account.
Kolko's principal error was myopia; he failed to look simultaneously at
state and federal regulatory responses.
The problem of state regulation was much different, and somewhat
more complicated. The state's jurisdictional power was roughly the mirror
image of the federal government's: a state could regulate shipments that
commenced and terminated within the state,199 but it had no power to
regulate interstate shipments. Indeed, in 1886 the Supreme Court made
clear that a state did not even have the power to regulate the intrastate
portion of an interstate shipment.200
The perceived intrastate regulation problem was not to save railroads
from bankruptcy resulting from ruinous competition, but rather to prevent
price gouging on short hauls. The extent to which this was true varied
from one state to another, depending on the degree of railroad develop-
ment within the state. This explains why states began regulating maxi-
mum railroad rates nearly a half century before the federal government
did, and why rate regulation first became prominent in relatively rural
states. When the Granger laws regulating maximum railroad rates were
first passed in the Midwest in the late 1860's and early 1870's,201 Minne-
sota, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa were in relatively early stages of rail-
road development, and there were many monopoly routes, upon which
freight rates were very high. 02 Even by that time, however, interstate
freight rates to the East were so low that farmers and merchants from
197. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88; see also United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895) (mere intent of monopolist manufacturer to ship items interstate does not provide suffi-
cient relation to commerce to justify federal jurisdiction). For identification of an intrastate bill of
lading as dispositive on the jurisdictional issue, see Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162
U.S. 184, 193 (1896).
198. G. KOLKO, supra note 9.
199. That is, a state had power to regulate shipments as long as the contracts clause or the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not interfere. See generally Hovenkamp, The Politi-
cal Economy of Substantive Due Process, supra note 48.
200. See Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). See infra text accompanying
notes 241-43.
201. See G. MILLER, supra note 21, at 172-73. As Miller notes, earlier Granger legislation regu-
lating maximum rates was not challenged.
202. Id. at 3-41.
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upstate New York were complaining that midwestern farmers could make
an interstate shipment to the Port of the City of New York as cheaply as
they could make an intrastate shipment of only one-tenth the distance. 03
Interestingly, when Congress was in the same position as the states, it
also legislated rates. For example, in 1886, more than two decades before
Congress first authorized federal rate setting, it passed a statute authoriz-
ing the construction of railroads in federal Indian territory.2 °4 The statute,
which authorized the Kansas City, Fort Scott, and Gulf Railroad Com-
pany to build a railroad, specifically provided that the railroad could not
set higher rates than those currently authorized by statute in the state of
Arkansas, and that passenger rates could not exceed three cents per mile.
Likewise, when Congress first incorporated a steam railroad to operate in
the District of Columbia, it set the railroad's maximum rates at six cents
per ton per mile for freight, and three cents per mile for passengers.20 5
Congress, just as much as the most radical Granger states, did not want
local railroads under its direct control to charge monopoly prices. On the
other hand, when Congress itself chartered a long interstate line, such as
the Union Pacific, which was chartered in 1862, it failed to set maximum
rates, either by statute or in the charter itself.20 ' Later when the Union
Pacific did charge very high rates, Congress entertained bills to control
them, but none ever passed.20 7
A. Extraterritorial Effects of State Regulation: From The Granger
Cases to The Minnesota Rate Cases
1. The Problem of State Free-Riding and Federal Judicial Review of
Rates
States could respond to the problem of high rates for intrastate hauls in
two ways. First, they might adopt an antidiscrimination provision that
either required railroad tariffs to be proportional to distance or forbade
rates on short hauls from being higher than rates for long hauls on the
same route and in the same direction. At first glance, such responses seem
more moderate than direct regulation of maximum rates. In fact, they
were more radical, for competition had forced long-haul rates too low to
cover fixed costs. Antidiscrimination provisions imposed the same below-
cost rates for intrastate traffic that the railroads were obtaining on inter-
state traffic.
Effective state legislation against most short-haul/long-haul discrimina-
203. See L. BENSON, supra note 22, at 40-43 (describing competition between intrastate and
interstate shipments from Midwest).
204. 25 Stat. 124 (1886).
205. 20 CONG. REC. 2322 (Feb. 26, 1889); see 2 L. HANEY, A CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF
RAILWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (1910).
206. For the text of the charter, see 2 L. HANEY, supra note 205, at 65-68.
207. Id at 108-10.
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tion became impossible in 1886 when the Supreme Court decided that a
state could control short-haul/long-haul discrimination only if terminal
points of both the long and short haul were within the state.208 Since
short-haul/long-haul discrimination was fundamentally an interstate
problem, the states substantially lost the power to control it.
The alternative was direct maximum rate regulation, which was
designed to keep local rates closer to long-haul rates. By the late 1870's,
many states were engaging in direct maximum rate regulation. Although
in Munn v Illinois the Court appeared to permit such regulation without
qualification,2 " it hinted in 1884 that it might review the rates themselves
if the "authorities do not exercise an honest judgment, or if they fix upon
a price which is manifestly unreasonable . *.". ."'" In 1890, the Court
held that the federal courts must review the substantive reasonableness of
the rates set.2" In 1898, in Smyth v. Ames,212 it condemned a maximum
rate that was too low for the railroad to recover its operating costs plus a
reasonable return on its property located within the regulating state.21
The federal courts were immediately embedded in a quicksand of substan-
tive rate cases.
The Supreme Court of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era often has
been criticized for giving the federal courts excessive authority to review
the substance of rates set by state statute or commission.214 However, the
potential for abuse, particularly for freeriding by the states, was substan-
tial, and federal control by either legislation or judicial intervention was
clearly necessary. Congress had no power over intrastate rates, so the job
fell to the courts. Those who criticize the Supreme Court for usurping
state administrative prerogatives 1 5 miss the point. The point was not that
the Court was a better fact finder than the agency, but that the agency
represented the state and its parochial interests. The federal courts were
the only competent federal arm to control state free riding and protect the
integrity of the national railroad system.
Before the Granger statutes regulating maximum railroad rates, most
rate regulation imposed by states was written into corporate charters,216
which often stipulated the maximum amount that the chartered firm could
208. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
209. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), and companion cases.
210. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 354 (1884) (Waite, C. J., also au-
thor of Court's opinion in Munn).
211. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
212. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
213. See infra text accompanying notes 232-35.
214. For a summary of the criticisms, see Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons From
the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187, 210-59 (1984).
215. The principal case that attracts this criticism is Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134
U.S. 418 (1890), which struck down a statute giving commission the authority to set rates and made
its findings unreviewable.
216. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 1290-91.
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charge.217 Such rate regulation by charter had a long pedigree. 21s Even
the Charles River Bridge charter, which was drafted in 1785, stipulated
the maximum tolls the proprietors could charge.219
Rates set by charter and rates set by statute differ in two important
respects. First, the charter is issued before the corporation has made its
investment. The timing of the charter prevents a state from taking advan-
tage of a corporation after it has committed funds to a project. This is not
true of statutory regulation, which generally is imposed after the corporate
investment. Once a bridge or railroad tracks are installed, the costs of
installation become "sunk" and cannot generally be recovered, whether or
not the facility goes into operation. As a result, a state could set a rate
slightly higher than direct operating costs, but not large enough to retire
the indebtedness for the capital expenditure. As long as operating costs
plus a small surplus were covered, the corporation would be better off
operating than shutting down.2
Second, a charter was a contract with the state, and no one was forced
to accept a charter unless its terms were agreeable. For that reason, even
laissez faire constitutional scholars such as Thomas M. Cooley, 21 who
generally opposed statutory rate regulation, and Isaac Redfield, the emi-
nent conservative legal authority on railroad law, 2  believed it was per-
missible to enforce charter provisions stipulating maximum rates. In a
charter, a corporation voluntarily agreed to limit its rates at the time it
negotiated the charter. On the other hand, statutory rate regulation im-
posed upon a firm whose charter said nothing about rates smacked of
"retroactive legislation" in which the state reneged on its original grant.223
By regulating rates on railroads that were chartered under the assumption
that the proprietors could set their own rates, the state effectively changed
217. A list of several state charters regulating railroad rates is given in The Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 412 nn.1-3 (1913). For discussions of rate regulation provisions in state railroad
charters, see Meyer, Railway Charters, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. A. (3d s.) 231 (1900); W.
NoYES, supra note 175, at 5-6, 214.
218. For a brief history of state railroad regulation by individual charter provision, see Adams,
Legislative Control Over Railway Charters, 1 Am. L. REv. 451 (1866).
219. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 1291 n.164.
220. Normally, a firm will continue to produce as long as it is able to recover its variable costs,
but will shut down when price falls below average variable cost. See H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONOMicS 373-74 (1987).
221. Cooley, supra note 35, at 210-11; Cooley, supra note 100, at 254-55.
222. 1 I. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF RAILWAYS 449-50 (3d ed. 1867).
223. Wharton, Retrospective Legislation and Grangerism, 3 INT'L Rav. 50 (1876); see also
Atwater, The Regulation of Railroads, 7 PRINCETON REV. (4th s.) 406 (1881); Brewer, Protection to
Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEw ENGLANDER 97 (1891) (Yale Law School commence-
ment address by Justice Brewer). Justice Field made a similar argument in his dissent in one of the
Granger cases, Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 183 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting).
The debate over the sovereign's power to regulate rates by statute rather than by charter was
revived when Congress began thinking about regulating interstate rates. See Bascom, Railroad Rates,
14 YALE REV. 237 (1905) (in favor of giving ICC rate-making power); Willcox, Rates By Fiat and
Existence By License, 14 YALE REv. 260 (1905) (against giving ICC rate-making power).
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the terms of a binding contract." 4 Isaac Redfield argued that rate regula-
tion of state-chartered railroads should come from the federal government,
for Congress had made such railroads no promises, and state rate regula-
tion might violate the contracts clause of the Constitution, which applied
only to the states. In the 1870's, he appealed unsuccessfully for congres-
sional control of railroad rates.225
The problem of state opportunism was exacerbated in the case of the
railroads, for most railroads were fundamentally interstate enterprises,
even if they operated under state charters. In 1866, Congress passed the
first national railroad regulation statute under its power to regulate inter-
state commerce. The bill facilitated the construction of interstate railroads
by providing that every steam railroad in the United States had the right
to carry its cargo into other states.228 The statute was designed to prevent
states from protecting their own railroads by refusing to accept cargo
shipped by railroads in adjacent states. 27 Whether because of this statute
or state eagerness to charter any new road, by the 1870's many railroads
had charters from multiple states and operated continuously through all of
them.
The state incentive to impose unremunerative rates on railroads became
much larger when the railroad was interstate.228 Since the railroads were
common carriers, they were required by law to accept in the ordinary
course of business all those willing to pay.229 The states had jurisdiction
only over purely intrastate traffic-that which both originated and termi-
nated within the state230-and this was typically less than fifteen percent
of the total.2"1 As a result, a very low rate on local traffic in any particu-
224. Wharton, supra note 223, at 61. Wharton argued that the "estates to vest in the future" may
be changed by legislation, but "estates now vested" may not, and previously granted charters were
clearly in the latter category. Id. at 56.
Although the railroads in the Granger cases were chartered, the grain elevator owned by Munn &
Scott, at issue in Munn v. Illinois, was an unchartered partnership. Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at
1309. Consistent with Wharton's argument, rate regulation applied to them would have been
permissible.
225. Redfield, supra note 107, at 9-10.
226. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2871 (1866).
227. But the statute provided that it should not "be construed to authorize any railroad company
to build any new road or connection with any other road without authority from the State in which
such railroad or connection may be imposed." Id.
228. When the regulating sovereign has authority over a smaller area than the extent of the firm
being regulated, the opportunities for self-dealing become more apparent. See Mashaw & Rose-
Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT
111-85 (G. Eads & M. Fix eds. 1984); Maloney, McCormick & Tollison, Economic Regulation,
Competitive Governments, and Specialized Resources, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 329 (1984); Hovenkamp &
MacKerron, supra note 29, at 765.
229. J. BEALE & B. WYMAN, supra note 153, §§ 101, 102 (1907).
230. See Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886); see also The Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 416 (1913) (summarizing earlier decisions as holding "that the state could
not prescribe interstate rates but could fix reasonable intrastate rates throughout its territory").
231. For example, in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 528-39 (1898), the Court found that 7.5% of
the railroad revenues generated in Nebraska came from intrastate traffic. See also id. at 543 (conclud-
ing that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy's intrastate earnings accounted for only 5% of its total earn-
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lar state would not have a substantial impact on the railroad's total reve-
nue, and the railroad would continue to operate within the state even if
the maximum permissible rates on the relatively small amount of intra-
state cargo were very low.
In Smyth v. Ames2" 2 the Supreme Court decided that state rates that
were too low to permit the railroads a reasonable return on the part of
their investment dedicated to local traffic amounted to an unconstitutional
taking of private property without due process of law. The Court rejected
the obvious argument, raised by the states, that if a railroad's overall busi-
ness within the state was profitable it should not matter what the rates
were on intrastate traffic.2"' Likewise, it rejected the argument that a state
could constitutionally reduce rates to a level sufficient to cover only direct
operating costs.234 Either of these rules would have shifted to interstate
traffic the burden of amortizing the railroads' fixed costs.2" 5
2. State Power To Regulate the Interstate Railway System
In the Granger cases,2 ' 6 the Supreme Court appeared to approve state
regulation of railroad rates if either the origin or the destination were
within the state. The Wisconsin Granger opinion opened with these
words:
These suits present the single question of the power of the legislature
of Wisconsin to provide by law for a maximum of charge by the
Chicago and North-western Railway Company for fare and freight
upon the transportation of persons and property carried within the
State, or taken up outside the State and brought within it, or taken
up inside and carried without. 37
For the next decade, the issue of state power to regulate came fre-
quently before the Supreme Court. The principal issue was the relation-
ship between the regulatory statute and the railroad's charter. The Su-
preme Court generally purported to begin with the premise that the
Contracts Clause exempted a railroad from regulation if its original char-
ter expressly allowed the railroad to set its own fares. The Court rejected
ings); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 438 (chart showing about 12% of Minnesota's traffic at
that time to be local); Ames v. Union Pac. Ry., 64 F. 165, 186 (C.C.D. Neb. 1894).
232. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
233. See id. at 486 (1898) (argument of John Webster and A. Churchill, Attorney General of
Nebraska).
234. The Nebraska Attorney General also made this argument in Smyth. Id. at 487.
235. For an analysis of Smyth and an extensive argument for federal takeover of state rate-
making, see White, Government Control of Transportation Charges, 46 Am. L. REG. (o.s.) 721
(1898), 47 Am. L. REG. (o.s.) 151, 288, 355 (1898-1899).
236. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877);
Peik v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Winona & St. P.R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180
(1877).
237. Peik, 94 U.S. at 175.
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virtually every contract clause challenge to a state rate regulation, how-
ever,238 finding either that the charter failed to give the railroad authority
to set its own rates, 39 or that earlier state legislation had reserved the
regulatory power to the state and thereby limited the subsequently
granted charter. 40
In Wabash Railway, the Supreme Court severely qualified 41 the
Granger cases by strictly limiting the state's regulatory power to ship-
ments that both commenced and terminated within the regulating state.
The Court struck down Illinois' application of a short-haul/long-haul an-
tidiscrimination provision to the rates from two different points in Illinois
to New York City. The Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway had carried
goods from Peoria, Illinois to New York for fifteen cents per hundred
pounds, while it carried goods of the same classification from Gilman,
Illinois to New York for twenty-five cents per hundred pounds. The dis-
tance from Peoria to New York was eighty-six miles greater than the
distance from Gilman to New York, and the route was identical: the goods
bound for New York from Peoria passed through Gilman on the way.
The Court found that application of the antidiscrimination statute to these
transactions was a regulation of interstate commerce forbidden to the
states.
The Wabash case appeared to undermine severely the power of the
states to regulate local rates by reducing short-haul/long-haul discrimina-
tion. Under Wabash, a midwestern state with two or more large traffic
centers, such as Chicago and Peoria, could continue to condemn short-
haul/long-haul discrimination between Peoria-Chicago traffic and traffic
to or from local points between those cities.242 But the greater purpose of
state control of short-haul/long-haul discrimination was to bring local
rates more closely into parity with interstate rates to the East, and Wa-
bash denied western states this power.
In his dissent in Wabash, Justice Bradley noted what appeared to be
obvious: The extraterritorial part of the route was identical in the two
shipments to which the Illinois antidiscrimination statute was applied.
The only difference in the two routes lay entirely within Illinois. As a
238. See Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, supra note 50.
239. E.g., Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 526 (1883).
240. E.g., id.; The Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); see also Dow v. Beidelman,
125 U.S. 680 (1888) (holding that when a railroad incorporated before 1874 consolidated with an-
other and was reincorporated after 1874, it became subject to 1874 state constitutional provision au-
thorizing government to set railroad rates).
241. The Court noted the apparent inconsistency with the Granger decisions, but suggested that
the question did not receive any elaborate consideration there, for the basic question-whether the
state had the right to regulate rates at all-"overshadowed all others ... ." Wabash, St. L. & Pac.
Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1886).
242. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 518 (1902) (upholding short-haul/long-
haul provision in Kentucky constitution if applied exclusively to long hauls entirely within state); see
also Louisville & N.R.R. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27 (1902) (reaffirming doctrine of Wabash case).
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result, the requirement of proportionality of rates along different routes
applied, if at all, only within the state. 4
However, Justice Miller's opinion for the Court noted something else:
application of the Illinois statute to shipments between Illinois and other
states could have a substantial effect on interstate rate-making. For exam-
ple, Justice Miller suggested, interstate competition might indicate a rate
of fifteen cents per hundred pounds from New York City to Peoria, but
the railroad would be forbidden from charging this low rate because it
was already charging higher rates on the noncompetitive parts of its lines.
The statute required it to charge the higher rate on the interstate ship-
ment as well. Likewise, Justice Miller argued, the rate charged by a rail-
road for a very short local haul-from Gilman, Illinois to Sheldon, a dis-
tance of twenty-three miles-would end up dictating the minimum rate
that the railroad could charge on interstate shipments, even though the
cost of loading and unloading accounted for almost the entire expense of
the short haul but only a small percentage of the expense of the long
haul.244
Justice Miller's illustrations were more rhetorical than realistic: he as-
sumed in all of them that the effect of the antidiscrimination provision
would be that the railroads would raise the rates for interstate shipments
rather than lower the rates for local shipments. The state legislature had
of course predicted the latter, and the legislature was almost certainly cor-
rect, because the interstate rates were set by competition. The Wabash
railway could comply with the statute only by lowering its local rates.
But Justice's Miller's basic observation was nonetheless valid. By
prohibiting short-haul/long-haul discrimination on interstate routes, a
state could effectively depress interstate freight rates along competitive
trunk lines. In the late 1880's railroad scholars already had begun to note
that state regulation was affecting interstate operations. 45 The Supreme
Court never dealt effectively with this important state power over inter-
state rates because of its stubborn distinction between "direct" and "indi-
rect" effects on interstate commerce. That an interstate rate had to be
adjusted to take into account a legislated intrastate rate was only an "indi-
rect" effect on interstate commerce, and the intrastate regulation did not
exceed state power.
Thus, in the circuit court opinion that was reviewed in Smyth v. Ames,
then-Judge Brewer refused to hold that a Nebraska maximum rate statute
unduly burdened interstate commerce, even though the resulting maxi-
mum intrastate rate forced a readjustment of interstate rates on traffic
243. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 578-80 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 576.
245. E.g., Clews, Legislative Injustice to Railways, 148 N. AM. REv. 319, 321 (1889) (arguing
that legislation of one state effected forcible, "unconstitutional" control of railroad practices in other
states as well).
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through surrounding states as well.24 6 Likewise, in the Louisville &
Nashville case,247 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that a short-
haul/long-haul antidiscrimination provision applied entirely within the
state was unconstitutional, despite the fact that application of the Ken-
tucky statute would force a change in long-haul rates determined by com-
petition with routes outside the state. The Court conceded that intrastate
rate regulation "may somewhat affect commerce generally"; however,
"such a result is too remote and indirect to be regarded as an interference
with interstate commerce . . .,.
During the decade after Smyth v. Ames, state power over interstate
rates became more fully understood. In approving the Smyth decision,
Harry Robinson, editor of The Railway Age, noted that individual states
were too small to regulate the rates of an essentially national railroad
system.2 49 The result was self-dealing, as each state tried to ensure that its
rates were no higher than the rates of its neighbors. Unfortunately, no one
was concerned for the integrity of the system as a whole. "It would be an
incalculable blessing, both to the people and the companies," Robinson
argued, "if the railway system of the United States could be treated as a
national unit under Federal control only."
'250
In a seminal article in 1908, How the States Make Interstate Rates,25'
Robert Mather, president of the Rock Island Railroad, showed how state
regulation of purely intrastate rates effectively controlled a broad range of
interstate rates.252 The largest force in setting interstate rates was compe-
tition. The effect of a maximum intrastate rate from one state border to
another, Mather illustrated, was that competitive lines outside the state
were forced to match the legislated rate or lose their business. This cre-
ated an effect which could be felt all the way up and down the line, and
over routes that crossed several states. More ominous, argued Mather,
was that the states were interested only in protecting their own constituen-
cies. Unlike the Interstate Commerce Commision, which had jurisdiction
over interstate rate-making, they had no regard for the integrity of the
system as a whole:
There is hardly a rate on' any article of commerce but feels the force
246. Ames v. Union Pac. Ry., 64 F. 165, 171 (C.C.D. Neb. 1894), afld sub nom. Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The statute was struck down, however, as denying the railroad a fair rate
of return on its investment.
247. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503 (1902).
248. Id. at 518. The Court applied similar reasoning in Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Minnesota,
186 U.S. 257, 267-70 (1902). See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 216 U.S. 579 (1910)
(upholding constitutionality of state law fixing coal carriage rates).
249. Robinson, State Regulation of Railways, 166 N. Am. REv. 398 (1898).
250. Id. at 398.
251. Mather, How the States Make Interstate Rates, 32 ANNALS, at 95, 102 (1908).
252. Id. For a similar argument, see Ripley, The Trunk Line Rate System: A Distance Tariff, 20
Q.J. ECON. 183 (1906).
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of these competitive conditions [on interstate routes]. They absolutely
dictate the traffic policy of the railroads operating in the territory
affected by them. The carrier makes no rates that are not effectively
moulded by these conditions, and the rate-making power of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission itself cannot ignore them. The only
rate-regulating body that makes rates without reference to these
commercial conditions is the legislature or the railroad commission of
a single state.253
Despite the concerns raised by academics and journalists, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Judge Brewer's circuit court ruling in Smyth in The
Minnesota Rate Cases254 in 1913. It conceded that the states had substan-
tial power over interstate rates, but once again it classified this power as
merely an "indirect" burden on interstate commerce. Additionally, the
Court held that in determining whether a state maximum rate was so low
as to be unconstitutionally confiscatory,255 the courts must look at operat-
ing costs plus the return on that portion of the tonnage carried within the
state devoted entirely to intrastate traffic.2 58 Under the Court's analysis, if,
for example, a railroad had property worth $1,000,000 within the state
and twelve percent of the traffic measured by ton miles was intrastate, the
intrastate rate must be high enough to give the railroad operating ex-
penses and a reasonable return on $120,000.717 Finally, the court placed
on the railroads the considerable burden of showing that the rates legis-
lated by the states were confiscatory.258
Under this rule, if a state set its rates at the constitutional minimum,
the railroad would have to amortize its fixed costs evenly over intrastate
and interstate traffic or it would fail to break even. Given that competition
tended to force rates on interstate routes to variable costs, the rule in The
Minnesota Rate Cases effectively permitted states to impose negative re-
turns overall. 59 This best explains why, Supreme Court intervention not-
253. Mather, supra note 251, at 104.
254. 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
255. In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 528-29 (1898), which held that railroads were entitled to
"just compensation" for their investment, the Court had set this standard for defining the minimum
reasonable rate of return that a state price regulation could impose.
256. In the Court's words,
[w]here the business of the carrier is both interstate and intrastate, the question whether a
scheme of maximum rates fixed by the State for intrastate transportation affords a fair return,
must be determined by considering separately the value of the property employed in the intra-
state business and the compensation allowed in that business under the rates prescribed.
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 435. The problem is discussed more fully in an earlier article
upon which the litigants may have relied. Robinson, The Legal, Economic and Accounting Principles
Involved in the Judicial Determination of Railway Passenger Rates, 16 YALE REv. 355 (1908). For
later criticism of the decision, see Collins, The Minnesota Rate Cases and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 48 AM. L. REv. 27 (1914).
257. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 438 n.1.
258. Id. at 465-66.
259. The Court rejected the argument that the value of the railroad's property within the state
should be established by a ratio to the total value of the railroad's property equal to the ratio between
intrastate gross revenue and total gross revenue. The Court found that this ratio, if based on pre-
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withstanding, the railroads sought, and Congress eventually felt obliged to
provide, preemption of the greater part of the state's rate-making power,
even respecting intrastate traffic.2 60 The Supreme Court should be criti-
cized not for interfering in the state rate-making process, but for setting a
constitutional minimum too low to prevent state free-riding, which under-
mined the integrity of the national railroad system.
B. The Development of Federal Supremacy
In the early 20th century, the perceived rapid growth of federal
supremacy over the American economy was controversial, but it appeared
to be inevitable. Woodrow Wilson found himself in a quandry. He wished
to protect the federalist system and the state's right to regulate, but he
recognized that the economy was national, that inconsistent state laws
were imposing enormous costs on business, and that there was no realistic
hope for uniform state lawmaking.2"' Henry Wade Rogers, Dean of the
Yale Law School, also admitted the problem, but he believed that the
states' authority to regulate their own business was essential to the preser-
vation of the federal system.2"2 The railroads stood at the crossroads of
this conflict of sovereignties. State prerogatives notwithstanding, expanded
federal control clearly lay on the horizon.
Congress gradually increased the authority of the Interstate Commerce
Commission over interstate rates. The Elkins Act of 1903 forbade rebat-
ing and required the railroads to file their rates with the Commission.26
Once filed, these rates became mandatory, and railroads were forbidden to
deviate from them. Since joint rate-making was legal under the Act, its
overall effect was to make cartel cheating more difficult. 6" Thus, the stat-
ute tended to shore up secret pools and price-fixing arrangements, and
may have made interstate rates more profitable.26 The Hepburn Act of
190666 additionally empowered the Commission, upon complaint, to de-
clare an existing rate unreasonable and prescribe a new one, thus giving
statute rates, would give the railroad a constitutional right to have perpetuated the same dispropor-
tionately high rates that the state was trying to control. Id. at 459-62. The Court was correct, but the
railroads were trying to preserve a system that acknowledged that rates on the competitive part of the
system were too low to become the basis for statutory rate regulation.
260. See infra text accompanying notes 283-86.
261. Wilson, The States and the Federal Government, 187 N. AM. REv. 684 (1908). For a more
optimistic account of the ability of states to act together to pass uniform state laws, see Allen, States
With Ideas of Their Own, 190 N. AM. REv. 515 (1909).
262. Rogers, The Constitution and the New Federalism, 188 N. AM. REv. 321 (1908).
263. Elkins Act of 1903, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903).
264. The statute both permitted the railroads to draft and propose rates jointly and prevented any
particular railroad from deviating from those rates. The best cartel is one facilitated by the govern-
ment itself.
265. By this time, pooling and other forms of price fixing had been condemned under the antitrust
laws. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
266. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906). For contemporary commentary, see Bryan, The Constitu-
tional Aspects of the Senatorial Debate Upon the Rate Bill, 41 AM. L. REv. 801 (1907); Cohn,
Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Interstate Commerce, 42 AM. L. REv. 666 (1908).
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the Commission its first real rate-making powers. The Mann-Elkins Act
of 1910267 carried the Commission's power one step further by giving it
the authority to suspend proposed changes in interstate rates pending an
investigation, and to condemn short-haul/long-haul discrimination with-
out the need for a complaint. The Mann-Elkins Act effectively gave the
Commission full control over interstate rates, subject to judicial review of
their reasonableness.
Already in 1889, the Interstate Commerce Commission had begun to
advocate broader federal control over intrastate railroad rates,2"' but Con-
gress did not assert such authority for another thirty years.26 9 On the con-
trary, it had explicitly exempted intrastate shipments from the Interstate
Commerce Act in 188770 and did so once again in the Hepburn Act in
1906.271 Congress probably continued to believe that it had no authority
to legislate intrastate rates, and thus refused to give that power to the
Commission.
However, the Commission received some encouragement in 1913 in The
Minnesota Rate Cases.272 The Court suggested that where the extraterri-
torial effects of intrastate rate-making were clear because of the "inter-
blending of the interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers,"
Congress might have the power to preempt state rate control. Such pre-
emption would require a showing that "adequate regulation of. . .inter-
state rates cannot be maintained without imposing requirements with re-
spect to . . . intrastate rates which substantially affect the former
")273
The Supreme Court made its position clearer a year later in The
Shreveport Rate Case,274 when it held that even the existing legislation
gave the Interstate Commerce Commission power over purely intrastate
rates if it could show that they actually burdened interstate traffic.
Shreveport, Louisiana was an important port city on the Red River, a
large tributary of the Mississippi with direct access to all Mississippi
River traffic. Substantial competition with water routes forced railroads to
make very low rates into and out of Shreveport. 5
267. Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910); see generally Dixon, The Mann-Elkins Act, Amending the Act
to Regulate Commerce, 24 Q.J. ECON. 593 (1910).
268. ICC Ann. Rep. 73-75 (1889).
269. See infra text accompanying notes 283-85.
270. Ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); see The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 417-18
(1913).
271. Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906); see The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 418.
272. 230 U.S. at 417.
273. Id. at 432-33.
274. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States; Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S.
342 (1914) [hereinafter The Shreveport Rate Case].
275. Such competition was not unique to the Texas-Louisiana area; it figured prominently in
long-haul rate-making across the country. For example, the rates charged by the Panama Canal
forced American coast-to-coast railroad rates to a level much lower than the level that prevailed be-
tween many pairs of inland cities. On the competition between railroads and canals, see Bogart, Early
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But the Texas Railroad Commission, which set Texas rates, 70 followed
its own policy of encouraging the economic growth of Texas cities. 27 It
attempted to compensate for the low interstate rates accorded to Shreve-
port by making rates within Texas much lower than the interstate rates
from Shreveport to the same Texas points. For example, the rate from
Houston to Lufkin, Texas, a distance of 118.2 miles, was 50 cents per
hundred pounds. The rate from Shreveport to Lufkin, a distance of 112.5
miles, was 69 cents. The effect of this scheme was to give Houston and
Dallas an advantage over Shreveport with respect to shipments originating
in or destined for other Texas points.
The Interstate Commerce Commission responded with an order that
was the obverse of the statute struck down in the Wabash Railwa278 case:
It ordered the carriers to make intrastate rates proportional to the prevail-
ing interstate rates.2 79 The classical theory of commerce clause power280
would have suggested that just as the state could not apply its antidis-
crimination provision to interstate traffic, Congress could not apply its an-
tidiscrimination law to intrastate traffic. In this case it was clear, however,
that the intrastate rate-making was having a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce:
The fact that carriers are instruments of intrastate commerce, as well
as of interstate commerce, does not derogate from the complete and
paramount authority of Congress over the latter, or preclude the
Federal power from being exerted to prevent the intrastate opera-
tions of such carriers from being made a means of injury to that
which has been confided to Federal care.2"'
The Court noted the lack of symmetry between its decisions condemning
state power and approving federal power over interstate/intrastate dis-
crimination, but concluded that it was "for Congress to supply the needed
correction where the relation between intrastate and interstate rates
presents the evil to be corrected .... "282
Canal Traffic and Railroad Competition in Ohio, 21 J. POL. EcoN. 56 (1913); Daggett, The Pan-
ama Canal and Transcontinental Railroad Rates, 23 J. POL. ECoN. 953 (1915); James, The Canal
and the Railway, 5 PUBLICATIONS AM. EON. A. 282 (1890). Bogart blamed railroad rate discrimi-
nation-lower rates in the presence of canal competition than the railroads charged elsewhere-for
the demise of the canals.
276. On the Texas Railroad Commission at this time, see Haney, Railway Regulation in Texas,
19 J. POL. EcoN. 437 (1911).
277. See W. RIPLEY, supra note 12, at 394.
278. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). See supra text accompanying
notes 241-44.
279. The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 347.
280. The theory was developed in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
281. The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351.
282. Id. at 355. Finally, the Court concluded that since Congress had the power to reach inter-
state/intrastate discrimination, that power could be delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. It then held that § 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, preventing railroads from making an
"undue or unreasonable preference or advantage" for one person over another, justified the Commis-
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The Shreveport Rate Case began to open Congress' eyes to the harmful
potential of simultaneous state and federal rate-making. It evntually re-
sponded with the Transportation Act of 1920,83 which rewrote railroad
regulatory policy,2"4 and for the first time created a single, national rail-
road system.28 5 The Transportation Act gave the Interstate Commerce
Commission substantial power to set intrastate as well as interstate rates,
and to set minimum as well as maximum rates. 8 ' The immediate result
was a number of Commission actions challenging unduly low state-
imposed rates on the theory that they discriminated against interstate com-
merce.2 17 In upholding the Commission's power over intrastate rates, the
Supreme Court expressly relied on the interstate effects of low intrastate
rates, concluding that "[i]f the railways are to earn a fixed net percentage
of income, the lower the intrastate rates, the higher the interstate rates
may have to be. . . .[Effective Commission administration of the Trans-
portation Act] will reasonably and justly require that intrastate traffic
should pay a fair proportionate share of the cost of maintaining an ade-
quate railway system."288
V. CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM AND REGULATORY CAPTURE
An important part of any theory of regulation is the identification of the
optimal regulatory sovereign. Who should regulate? The most serious
problem the railroads faced in the late nineteenth century was not that no
one understood the simple economics of running railroads, for many
did.289 Far more serious was that for half a century the primary task of
controlling an essentially national railroad system had been left to the
states with their parochial interests. The railroads looked to the federal
government for salvation, because they wanted some order in a national
system that was falling apart.
That American railroads were going bankrupt, that they petitioned
Congress for relief, and that Congress responded with legislation may be
consistent with a capture theory of regulation, but it falls far short of
sion's order. Id. (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 380) (1887).
For contemporary analysis of the problem, see Coleman, The Commerce Clause and Intrastate
Rates, 12 COL. L. REv. 321 (1912); Coleman, The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Intrastate
Rates: The Shreveport Rate Cases, 28 HARV. L. REV. 34 (1914).
283. Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456; Act of May 8, 1920, ch. 172, 41 Stat. 589.
284. For example, section five reversed Congress' longstanding opposition to pooling, and permit-
ted the practice under certain circumstances, subject to Commission approval. 1 I. SHARFMfAN, supra
note 12, at 183.
285. See id. at 177-244.
286. Title IV, § 416, 41 Stat. 484 (1920), amending § 13 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
287. E.g., In re Rates, Fares, and Charges of the New York Central R.R. & Other R.R. in N.Y.,
59 I.C.C. 290 (1920); In re Intrastate Rates Within Ill., 59 I.C.C. 351 (1920); Wisconsin Passenger
Fares, 59 I.C.C. 391 (1920), enforced sub nom. Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,
257 U.S. 563 (1922).
288. 257 U.S. at 586.
289. See supra text accompanying note 140.
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establishing capture. Americans had made a policy choice in favor of pri-
vately-owned rather than state-owned railroads. Clearly one might argue
that state ownership of the railroads would have been better for America
than private ownership, but the work of capture ideologues such as
Gabriel Kolko makes no attempt to do this.
Given the assumption of privately owned railroads, any responsible ap-
preciation for the historical development of railroad regulation must in-
clude the premise that the investor-owned railroad company is entitled to
earn a profit. Protection of railroad profits is as important to government
regulatory policy as is consumer protection, for without profits no new
investment can be expected. This fact seems to have escaped Kolko, who
saw every congressional or Commission move to protect railroad profits as
a conspiracy directed at the railroads' consumers. Kolko simply overlooked
the fact that shippers and farmers profited as much from the railroads as
did railroad stockholders. Moreover, there is nothing necessarily inconsis-
tent with the public interest in the railroads' desire for a regulatory
scheme that allowed them to gain some positive return on investment. Ev-
eryone had a strong long-run interest in the maintenance of an economi-
cally healthy railroad system, whatever their short run interests may have
been.
But the difficulties of the Kolko thesis are not merely a matter of eco-
nomics or logic. They go to the historical record as well. One problem is
the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act itself. The Act (1) contained no provi-
sion authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to set minimum
rates; (2) forbade pooling; and (3) prohibited short-haul/long-haul dis-
crimination. On its face, this appears to be the worst possible statute for
the railroads. Rates on competitive lines-the only ones that Congress had
the power to regulate 29 -would continue to be set by competition, and
competition dictated unprofitable rates. Further, the two devices that had
permitted the railroads to earn net positive returns were condemned. The
Act appeared to reduce the railroads' power to use pools to cartelize com-
petitive markets, and they could no longer use monopoly rates from short
hauls to offset the competitive returns they were obtaining from long
hauls.
Because of the efforts of the Commission, which continued to favor
pooling in spite of the antipooling clause, 91 and the Supreme Court,
which interpreted the long-haul/short-haul clause narrowly," 2 these pro-
visions of the Act did not do as much damage to the railroads as they
290. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
291. See supra text accompanying note 117.
292. ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897) (competition should be taken into ac-
count in cases challenging long-haul/short-haul discrimination, and discrimination permitted if com-
petition required lower rate for long haul). Since competition explained virtually all instances of
short-haul/long-haul discrimination, the decision eviscerated the long-haul/short-haul clause of the
original Interstate Commerce Act.
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could have. But if Congress had any role in easing the burden on rail-
roads, it was more a result of poor drafting than of legislative policy. The
development of the original Interstate Commerce Act makes a strong case
for the premise that Congress did not want to do the railroads any favors,
and that the Supreme Court's record was ambiguous-emasculating the
antidiscrimination section, but virtually eliminating pooling under the an-
titrust laws.293
The record of congressional activity in the area of railroad regulation in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries is probably as consistent with the
traditional Progressive public interest theory of regulation as it is with the
Kolko thesis or other alternative theories. " " The alternative that makes
the most sense is that, beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887, the national railroad system first became a regulated "mar-
ket"-that is, an industry regulated by a sovereign large enough to en-
compass all its operations. The resulting regulatory policy was not perfect;
on the contrary, it was experimental and filled with flaws. But the flaws
were not ones of motive or extreme naivete. They were flaws that derived
from two things-first, an economic model that was incomplete and only
imperfectly understood; and second, a set of constitutional rules and his-
torical precedents that continually forced Congress to show excessive def-
erence to state interests until the Supreme Court finally relaxed its views
about congressional power over intrastate rates. Such a record makes a
poor case for congressional philandering with the regulated.
293. See 1 I. SHARFMAN, supra note 12, at 11-70.
294. One alternative is that Congress merely wanted to control the economic power of the rail-
roads, even if that reduced efficiency; Congress preferred a broken down system to an economically
powerful one. See A. MARTIN, supra note 31; Martin, supra note 38. The atomization of the eco-
nomic power of railroads may have been the long-term effect of governmental regulation, but no one
has produced a convincing argument that it was the motive of Congress, the ICC, the Supreme Court,
or any other governmental entity.
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